New Jersey Institute of Technology

Digital Commons @ NJIT
Dissertations

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Fall 1-31-2002

On the data hiding theory and multimedia content security
applications
Litao Gang
New Jersey Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations
Part of the Electrical and Electronics Commons

Recommended Citation
Gang, Litao, "On the data hiding theory and multimedia content security applications" (2002).
Dissertations. 517.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations/517

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital
Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ NJIT. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu.

Copyright Warning & Restrictions
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.”
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user
may be liable for copyright infringement,
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order
would involve violation of copyright law.
Please Note: The author retains the copyright while the
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to
distribute this thesis or dissertation
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select
“Pages from: first page # to: last page #” on the print dialog screen

The Van Houten library has removed some of the
personal information and all signatures from the
approval page and biographical sketches of theses
and dissertations in order to protect the identity of
NJIT graduates and faculty.

ABSTRACT
ON THE DATA HIDING THEORY AND MULTIMEDIA CONTENT
SECURITY APPLICATIONS
by
Litao Gang

This dissertation is a comprehensive study of digital steganography for multimedia
content protection. With the increasing development of Internet technology,
protection and enforcement of multimedia property rights has become a great
concern to multimedia authors and distributors. Watermarking technologies provide
a possible solution for this problem.
The dissertation first briefly introduces the current watermarking schemes,
including their applications in video, image and audio. Most available embedding
schemes are based on direct Spread Sequence (SS) modulation. A small value pseudo
random signature sequence is embedded into the host signal and the information is
extracted via correlation. The correlation detection problem is discussed at the
beginning. It is concluded that the correlator is not optimum in oblivious detection.
The Maximum Likelihood detector is derived and some feasible suboptimal detectors
are also analyzed. Through the calculation of extraction Bit Error Rate (BER), it is
revealed that the SS scheme is not very efficient due to its poor host noise suppression.
The watermark domain selection problem is addressed subsequently. Some implications on hiding capacity and reliability are also studied. The last topic in SS
modulation scheme is the sequence selection. The relationship between sequence
bandwidth and synchronization requirement is detailed in the work. It is demonstrated that the white sequence commonly used in watermarking may not really
boost watermark security.

To address the host noise suppression problem, the hidden communication is
modeled as a general hypothesis testing problem and a set partitioning scheme is
proposed. Simulation studies and mathematical analysis confirm that it outperforms
the SS schemes in host noise suppression. The proposed scheme demonstrates
improvement over the existing embedding schemes.
Data hiding in audio signals are explored next. The audio data hiding is
believed a more challenging task due to the human sensitivity to audio artifacts
and advanced feature of current compression techniques. The human psychoacoustic
model and human music understanding are also covered in the work. Then as a
typical audio perceptual compression scheme, the popular MMP3 compression is visited
in some length. Several schemes, amplitude modulation, phase modulation and noise
substitution are presented together with some experimental reslIlts. As a case study,
a music bitstream encryption scheme is proposed. In all these applications, human
psychoacoustic model plays a very important role. A more advanced audio analysis
model is introduced to reveal implications on music understanding. In the last part,
conclusions and future research are presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Digital Steganography and its Application
With the rapid ever-growing Internet technology, multimedia content protection has
raised great concerns in multimedia creation and delivery community. The traditional
data encryption protection methods, such as RSA, DES 76, 80, 85 do not meet
all the repuirements. Recent years have seen lots of research and application of
watermarking or steganography technology to address this issue.
Steganography is the art to embed some message in a host (or cover) signal
without noticeable perceptual degradation. The technologies provide a potential
solution to the content protection problem. The message could be copyright information or product information, for ownership proof or copyright infringement
tracking.
Two basic requirements for Steganography is transparency and robustness.
The former means the perceptual value of the cover signal should not degrade
after information embedding. Robustness implies the watermark should not be
removed easily. It is particularly important to achieve robustness against the
popular compression schemes because of their ubiquitous applications in network
transmission and storage. To provide a convincing proof for proprietary copyright,
the message should be smartly integrated with the content signal and sufficiently
robust against compressions and other signal processing (even malicious pirate
attacks). Watermark is supposed to be highly tamper-proof in these applications.
Based on the different application scenarios, steganography can be divided into
two categories, oblivious applications where the original cover signal is absent at the
information extraction, and escrow applications where decoding is performed with
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the assistance of the original cover signal. Because the original cover signal is not
available in most scenarios, it is not strange to see that the current research and
development is focused on oblivious applications.
Watermarking for content protection is a specific application of hidden communication. Steganography is usually a more general term which refers to delivering
a message in a manner that the very existence of the message itself is kept secret.
Watermarking can be considered a subset of steganograpliy [46_. In this dissertation,
"data hiding" refers to the general information embedding in the cover signal whereas
"watermarking" refers to the hiding with emphasis on robustness and security.
As a kind of digital steganography technology, watermarking is different
from data encryption. One prominent difference between data encryption and
steganography is that the latter does not prevent unauthorized access. Encryption,
on the other hand, does not permit unauthorized access to the contents. Once the
encrypted contents are correctly unscrambled, the protection is completely removed.
In contrast, a robust watermark is integrated with the content signal all the time
and is very difficult (if not impossible) to remove.
Steganography has long been modeled as a communication problem. Figure 1.1
and Figure 1.2 depict the channel models in escrow and oblivious applications. The
transmission channel noise is compression noise, or other noises incurred in signal
processing procedures.

Content ,

Watermarked

Embedding
Signal X

Channel
'

Message M

Signal X'

Received
Detection
Signal R'

Extracted
Message M'

Original Signal X

Figure 1.1 Escrow steganography

Watermarking used for ownership proof is often referred to as robust water-

marking which is aimed at copyright protection. Another form of watermark is called
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Content

Watermarked
Embedding

Signal X

A

Channel
Signal A

.

Received
Detection
Signal R'

Extracted
-

Message M'

Message M

Figure 1.2 Oblivious steganography
fragile 'watermarking (or semi-fragile 'watermarking) which targets at multimedia
authentication scenarios 25, 57, 66, 102]. In this application, a watermark is
embedded into a host signal as a signature of authentication for the content. If
the watermark can not be recovered correctly at the receiver side, that means this
content has been manipulated. A typical application is proposed to authenticate the
photo image in a digital filminess camera [26
Besides authentication and copyright protection, data hiding also rinds its way
in other applications. NEC, IBM and other companies have proposed and implemented schemes for DVD copy (not copyright) protection control [8, 59, 601]. Lucent,
Philips etc. are deploying their watermarking product for broadcast monitoring.
Some companies, for example , RealPlayer plans to integrate data hiding into their
multimedia players.
In the digital steganography community, lots of attention is paid to image data
hiding. One of the earliest watermarking schemes is LSBM (Least Significant Bit
Manipulation). In this scheme, the LSB bits are modified according to a predefined
pattern to carry messages (for example, modify its parity). Obviously, this scheme
is puite crude and does not resist compression and other unintentional attacks, let
alone pirate attacks.
In current watermarking schemes, a most influential one is Spread Spectrum
(SS) modulation approach. The idea is borrowed from spread-spectrum radio
communications. Cox et al. 14, 16] are among the earliest to apply the scheme in
image watermarking. In one of his schemes, a Gaussian distributed PN sequence
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is inserted into the block DCT coefficients. This idea can be applied to different
watermark domains. Some work in the whole image DCT domain instead of block
DCT domain [15

Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) phase domain '77], DFT

amplitude domain

8_, wavelet domain 49, 96] etc. Various Human Visual System

(HVS) models are explored to minimize the visual artifacts. Some models work in
the pixel domain 90, 99], while many others work in transform domains [18, 92].
There are few publications on video watermarking applications. Most watermarking schemes regard video as a consecutive sequence of still images. The image
steganography schemes could be applied to video, where embedding and detection is
done on a frame by frame basis. This is the direct extension of image watermarking
to the uncompressed (raw) video. An alternative is to embed information in the
compressed domain. Jordan et al. 247 proposed a scheme to embed the watermark
signature into the motion vectors. The author claims survivability to the MPEG
compressions. Hartung et al. [36, 37, 39] suggested a SS method extension in video.
The message extraction computation complexity in video should not be too high
due to the real-time processing requirement. Another repuirement is the robustness
against MPEG compressions, frame dropping, frame averaging and other attacks.
There are even fewer publications on audio steganography which is regarded as
the more challenging task. Generally speaking, audio signals have much less samples
than video. Although this reduces the processing complexity, it limits the hiding
capacity.
It is believed that Human Audible System (HAS) is much more sensitive to the
artifacts than the Human Visual System (HVS). The embedding distortion inaudibility is more difficult to control. The general audio signal can not be regarded
stationary (at most be assumed semi-stationary). Fortunately, through subjective
tests and theory studies, people have accumulated extensive knowledge on HAS
and human perception models. Several models have been explored and successfully
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employed in perceptual compression, for instance MPEG-i MPG compression [44],
Dolby Audio Encoder AC-3 _J9]. This knowledge should be employed in data hiding
to minimize artifacts.
In audio steganography, compression-resilience is also more difficult to achieve
as the current audio coding algorithms are more advanced. In image and video
compression, the algorithms are mainly based on waveform approximation. The
compression schemes usually target at MSE (Mean Spuare Error). i.e., maximizing
SNR (Signal-Koise Ratio). The popular compression schemes, SPIHT (Set Partitioning Image Hierarchical Tree) [79], EZW (Embedded Zero Wavelet) 82 focus
on puantization and encoding technipue after transform or subband filtering. It is
expected that the compression noise is not high, the compressed waveform is still close
to the uncompressed original signal. In the perceptual audio compression schemes,
the purpose is to minimize the perceptual degradation, not VISE. Since it is known
that human beings do not measure audio puality in ISE sense. The compression
noise could be much higher. In the more advanced audio parametric coding schemes,
such as IPEG-4 HILN [J and the model proposed in [56, 94, 95

,,

audio signal is

analyzed and some important parameters are extracted to "describe" the original
signal. The reconstructed output at decoder with these parameters may not be close
to the original signal. Compression puality can not measured in common sense SIR
(Signal-Noise Ratio).
In current audio data hiding schemes, some are the direct extension of the basic
SS scheme to audio signal. A random signature sepuence is embedded in subband
domain [4, 42], cepstra domain [55] or time domain 6 etc. The human perceptual
model is explicitly used to shape the watermark signal spectrum according to the
masking curve 9 . This is an effective method in controlling the watermark audibility.
-
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1.2 Organization of the Dissertation

In this research, steganographv is studied as a general hidden communication
problem. In this dissertation, data hiding schemes are investigated from the
perspective of signal processing and new algorithms with improved performance
over the existing ones are studied. Other data hiding issues are also comprehensively
explored, with some concentration on audio applications. Other related topics in
multimedia watermarking application are also discussed.
In Chapter 2, the history and development of digital steganography is briefly
reviewed , some influential data hiding algorithms in still image, video and audio
signals are visited. In practice, the Spread Spectrum (SS) schemes are widely
employed. In Chapter 3, a. thorough study of the current SS algorithms in data hiding
is presented. The hiding capacity is analyzed. The problem of watermark domain
selection and its impact on compression robustness is also addressed. Opti mum.
detection in oblivious applications is explored. It is found that the correlation
detector is not optimal in oblivious applications. A new scheme is derived and
its performance is compared with the existing ones. The random sepuence security
and watermark signature generation is also covered in Chapter 3.
From the analytical and simulation results, it is concluded that the spread
spectrum modulation although effective in escrow applications, is not quite successful
in oblivious applications. In Chapter 4, a new scheme set partitioning is proposed
in oblivious applications. In the mathematical analysis and simulation studies,
i mprovement is demonstrated over the existing schemes, especially in very noisy

environment.
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the audio compression-resistant data hiding.
Initially several different audio compression schemes are visited, including waveform
approximation, perceptual coding and parametric coding. Because of the popular
deployment of MPEG-1 layer III (MP3) compression in Internet transmission and
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storage, as an example, this compression and human perceptual psychoacoustic
model is briefly introduced. Based on this, three hiding schemes, amplitude
modulation, phase modulation and noise substitution are proposed. A music
encryption scheme is proposed. The last section in Chapter 5 is devoted to the
advanced audio analysis model and its impacts on audio watermarking. Chapter 6
covers some outstanding problems in watermarking and data hiding applications.
Conclusions are drawn and the future work is proposed.

CHAPTER 2
CURRENT TECHNIQUES AND STATUS
In this chapter, the existing technologies used in still image, video and audio content
signals are briefly visited.

2.1 Steganography Applications in Images
The first application of digital watermarking is on still images. One of the earliest
data hiding schemes embeds information in pixel's Least Significant Bits (LSB),
called LAB Manipulation (LSBI) [93, 98 . It is obvious that LSBM is not robust
against compression and other attacks. Spread Spectrum (SS) modulation algorithms
embed a small value PN sepuence in the selected components of the content signals
[7, 161]. It provides much improvement over LSBM on security and robustness.
Most of the current watermarking schemes are SS-based, including both escrow and
oblivious applications. These schemes can be put into two categories, spatial domain
embedding and transform domain embedding.
2.1.1 Pixel Domain Embedding
Bender et al. 7] propose a data hiding scheme called "Patchwork" . In this scheme,
pixel values ail and ibnardbomlysectw-pixarncesd
decreased respectively by a very small value b . For an unmarked original image,
it can be assumed that the pixel value x i is a random variable with zero mean.
Therefore,

E (a —b)O.

N-

(2.1)

il ib

i=o

This makes intuitive sense since the number of times a il is greater than bib should
be offset by the number of times the reverse is true.
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After watermarking, the detection output is
N-1

E [(a

N-1
il

6) — (bib — )] = 26N (ail —

i=0

(2.2)
i=0

In a watermarked image, the mathematical expectation value of (2.2) deviates
from 0. If the pixel pair number N is sufficiently large, a reliable decision based on
the statistical sum can be made
This method can be easily extended to data hiding. Embedding procedure is

= ail + 6, b = bib — 6; bit value 1 embedded
= ail—6,bz= ib+6;bitvalue0mbed ,

(2.3)

where a and bpi are the pixel values after bit embedding.
Detection is based on sum of these pixels,

=
where Ai and

i=0

`2.4)

6 i are the received pixel values after channel transmission. If

q > 0, the decision is bit value 1; Otherwise, the decision is bit value 0 instead.
Bender et al. 7 analyzed the extraction bit error probability and the impact
of different patch shapes on robustness. Pitas et al. [62 proposed a puite similar
method. Further extension can be found in 53, 54 The advantage of spatial domain
scheme is its efficiency and low computation cost. The shortcoming is that the pixel
number N should be sufficiently large which limits the hiding capacity.
To reduce the watermark visibility, extra work should be done to control the
visual artifacts. Macp et al. 20] proposed a scheme to make the watermark adaptive
to the Human Visual System (HVS). For a color image, it is well known that human
being are most insensitive to the blue component. Kutter et al. "50, 51] took use
of this property and embed information into the blue component. It is claimed that
the visible distortion is thus minimized.
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2.1.2 Transform Domain Embedding

Many Spread Spectrum modulation schemes are applied in transform domains. As
a case study, the approach proposed by Cox et al. 16] is revisited in the following
discussion.

Original

Transform
Transfrom

Image

Embedding
Coefficients

Inverse
Transform

Watermarked
Image

Watermark
Signal

Figure 2.1 Transform domain embedding framework

After transform, some appropriate coefficients x i in this domain are selected.
They are usually the medium frequency coefficients to which humans are not so
sensitive. A randomly generated signature sepuence sib is embedded into x i ,
x i = x i + sib .

(2.5)

I 16 , the signature sepuence used is Gaussian distributed due to its enhanced

security over the bipolar sepuence (--1 or +1 bi-value sepuence).
Denote the received sequence after channel transmission as r. With the
assistance of the original sequence x, the correlation detector output is
—

(rib— x i ) • sib =

q=
i

(s i + n i ) • s i ,

(2.6)

=o

where nib is the channel noise.
Correlation detector is optimal only if nib is Gaussian distributed. It is worth
noting here that often the watermarking channel is far from Gaussian type. However,
correlation is a feasible method and mostly used in watermark verification due to its
simplicity.
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To control the artifacts introduced in this approach, several formulae are
suggested to determine the embedding extent [16],

= xi + a Xi,

(2.7)

= x2 (1 +

(2.8)

= x (e

(2.9)

where a is a scaling factor.
For different frequency bins, the value of a should be adaptive to the human
sensitivity. Very similar HVS model was suggested in [67 . The visual threshold
value may be obtained from a visual perceptual model or empirical experiments.
This principle is also applied in other transform domains. For example, 49, 101, 103
apply the wavelet domain embedding as a direct variation of this scheme.
In transform domain. steganography, the transform selection problem has not
been answered. An ideal watermark transform should be superior in performance
and low in computation complexity. This problem is addressed in Chapter 3.

2.1.3 DFT Domain Embedding
In image data hiding applications, it is important to achieve robustness against
geometric distortions, for example. translation, rotation, and scaling. Scanning
procedure can be modeled as a combination of these distortions. There does not exist
an ideal solution to countermeasure these attacks. A heuristic approach is to embed
a fixed pattern into images and at decoder try to estimate the values of rotation,
scaling and translation by pattern match and then compensate for these changes.
This is usually done via the simple brute force exhaustive search and therefore a
puite computation extensive procedure.
Ruanaidh et al. 78 proposed a novel scheme to hide information in DFT
amplitude domain. It is translation resistant because the spatial shift is only reflected
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in the DFT phase, which is not used in embedding. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated in practice.
Another important feature of DFT amplitude embedding is that the DFT
amplitude is perceptually insignificant. It was pointed that the DFT phase contains
much more information than the DFT amplitude [64 . As the current popular
image compression schemes aim at waveform approximation, the compression noise
is relatively small. In the perceptually insignificant DFT amplitude domain, more
watermark energy is permitted without much visible artifacts. This results in relative
higher SKR. Ramkumar and Akansu 71, 73, 75 pointed out the advantage in DFT
domain embedding. Their simulation results demonstrate the robustness in face of
various compression schemes.
The above conclusion seems to contradict the long-held view that the watermark
should be embedded into the perceptually significant components [14]. That is true
embedding in DFT amplitude is not tamper resistant. A smart attacker can also
use the property of DFT amplitude insignificance to inject more attack noise. The
DFT domain embedding just takes advantage of the current compression schemes.
Ruanaidh et al. [77 also suggested to embed information in the perceptually
significant DFT phase. It claims enhanced security against malicious attacks.
The pixel domain and transform domain selection have different impacts on the
robustness and complexity. Needless to say, the spatial domain embedding is less
computation extensive. Some studies show that the transform domain approaches
are more robust to geometric distortion.
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2.2 Video Steganography
2.2.1 Embedding in Raw Uncompressed Video

If a video signal is regarded as a continuous still image sequence, the image data
hiding scheme can be employed frame by frame to a video sepuence. In fact, most
of the current approaches are the direct extension of image embedding schemes.
Hartung et al. 37, 38, 39 directly extended the image data hiding in the
video signal. A pseudo-noise bipolar sepuence p (p i is either +1 or —1) is embedded
into the selected 8x8 DCT coefficients v i . In their approach, a random sepuence is
embedded into these coefficients.
vi

(2.10)

where cxi is the locally adjustable amplitude factor which varies according to the
local properties of the video signal. The spatial and temporal masking phenomena
of HVS can be applied in embedding. The message is retrieved via correlation at
decoder. Their experiments demonstrate the typical hiding capacity is up to 50
bits sec.
Swanson et al. [89, 91 proposed a multi-scale watermarking method. First,
the video sepuence is segmented into scenes. Then a temporal wavelet transform
is applied to each video scene, and temporal low-pass and high-pass frames are
obtained. The watermark signal then is embedded into both frames. After inverse
transform the watermarked video is obtained. Note the watermark is also embedded
the low-frepuency components. To minimize artifacts visibility, a HVS model
is exploited in this approach. An efficient watermark embedding is "Millennium"
proposed by Digimarc, Philips and Macroyision 13] for DVD copy protection control.
Its advantage lies in simplicity and translation invariance.
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2.2.2 Embedding in Compressed Video

Instead of embedding directly in the raw video, data can also be embedded in the
compressed domain. In both of MPEG-i and MPEG-2 compression standards, the
block Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is used. The video sepuence is composed of
I, P, and B frames. In I (inter-coded) frames, the picture is split into 8x8 blocks.
Then the DCT coefficients are quantized, zig-zag reordered and Huffman encoded in
a similar fashion used in JPEG compression. In the inter-coded frames (P or B), the
pictures are encoded using forward or backward prediction. The motion vectors and
residual prediction error are puantized and encoded.
Hartung et al. also experimented their embedding scheme (2.10) in compressed
domain [39]. This procedure is applied to every frame, including I, P, B frames. For
each compressed frame, the watermark signal is added to the 8x8 DCT coefficients
in the video bitstream. Experimental results demonstrate its robustness against
standard signal processing.
Jordan et al. [24 suggested a very interesting approach to embed information
in the motion vectors in the compressed bitstream. As motion vectors are significant
perceptually, only areas with less activity are selected for embedding. The authors
claims artifact invisibility. The information is directly retrieved from the motion
vectors in the compress video. The greatest advantage of this scheme is its low
complexity.

2.3 Audio Steganography

In comparison, there are few publications on audio data hiding. Usually, the audio
steganography is assumed a more challenging task. One reason is the human beings
are more sensitive to watermark distortion. Another reason is the current audio
coding technique is much more advanced than the schemes used in image coding,
making the robustness to those compressions more difficult.
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2.3.1 Echo Hiding

Bender et al. [7 suggested an innovative scheme to hide information in audio. This
method adds a decayed version of the original signal to itself. The echo is determined
by three parameters: initial amplitude, decay rate, and offset (the delay when the
echo appears). Usually, the decaying curve used is exponential.
Informal tests show that with appropriate parameters, the echo added is
inaudible, only making the original "richer". The information bit can be embedded
by selecting different offset values. In Figure 2.2, to embed bit value 0, the offset
value is x while the offset value is x + 6 if bit value 1 is embedded.

Original signal
Zero
1 Initial amplitude
One Decay rate
)

x

Offset

6

Delta
Figure 2.2 Audio echo hiding

Data extraction is via measuring different offset delay value. First, the
cepstrum of the embedding output is calculated. Then the autocorrelation of the
ceptrum is obtained. With the echoes spaced periodically every x or x + (5, a peak
at x or x + 6 in the cepstrum can be obtained. The decision rule is to examine the
power level at x and x + 6 and choose whichever bit corresponds to a higher power
level.
2.3.2 Other Schemes

The SS modulation can be extended to audio applications. Pitas et al. [6] repeated
the PK sequence embedding in the time domain. Tewfik et al. 9] proposed an
embedding scheme in frequency domain. One contribution of the algorithm is
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that the explicit human psychoacoustic model is employed to shape the watermark
spectrum. The watermark distortion is kept under the masking for distortion inaudibility. In embedding, a watermark signature spectrum is shaped by a filter which
is derived from the psychoacoustic model analysis. Some similar schemes were
proposed in 6
1

,

62]. The detail of the human psychoacoustic model is given in length

in Chapter 5.
There are some other SS versions in other domains. In [5 ], the embedding
and detection was performed in the cepstrum domain. The shortcoming is that in
that domain, distortion inaudibility is more difficult to control. Other approaches
include data hiding by time-domain modification [58 , or by compressed domain
manipulation. An example of the latter is the simple scheme modifying the scale
factors in NIP3 bitstream. 69].

2,4 Application and Product Deployment

Since 1996, the digital steganography technologies have attracted lots of attention
both in the industry and academia. Nowadays there are several commercial products
on market and some have been deployed in practice.
Digimarc Corp. is a leader in watermarking technology. Products it provides
include ImageBridge and MediaBridge for image watermarking. Besides,
Digimarc MarcSpider image tracking can crawl the World Wide Web searching for
digitally watermarked images to find illegal publications of copyright images. Some
corporations have already entered into contracts with the Digimarc company for the
use of PictureMarc and MarcSpider, to protect their interests in digital images.
Even Digimarc Corp. itself admits the watermark is vulnerable to common signal
processing attacks. There are some other companies providing similar steganography
products. For example, Signum Technologies offers SureSign watermark product for
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content protection. Their product works together with Adobe Photoshop. MediaSec
Technologies provides MediaLabel and SysCop products.
Cogn city Corp. provides audio watermarking product AudioKey. It claims
its robustness to all popular audio compression schemes. Up to 2 layer information
can be embedded, reaching total hiding rate of 62 bits per second. The watermark is
imperceptible due to the use of psychoacoustic models of human hearing. It also
claims robustness to music editing, format conversion (including D/A and A/D
conversions), compression, streaming, broadcast, etc. This product was adopted
to integrate with the AT& T perceptual audio encoder and RealPlayer's Producer
Plus G2 encoder.
Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) is initiated by several label companies to
prevent illegal CD copying. They want to standardize the SDMI-cainpliant players
which can play unprotected music and new SDMI-protected music that has been
legitimately acpuired. A proposal by Aerance Corp., a company aiming exclusively at audio watermarking, was adopted by SDI as Phase I standard. In DAD
copy protection applications , there exists two major proposals, one is Galaxy Group
proposed by Hitachi, IBM, NEC, Pioneer Electronic, and Sony, while Philips, Macrovision, Digimarc unify and offer their Millennium Group products. In the near future,
more products will be seen on the market together with more applications of data
hiding technology.

CHAPTER 3
SPREAD SPECTRUM MODULATION IN STEGANOGRAPHY
In the previous chapters, the Spread Spectrum (SS) modulation scheme in steganography
is reviewed. In this chapter, this technipue is discussed in detail, including its information extraction and watermark domain selection. A new algorithm is proposed
and compared with the existing ones. Its effectiveness is demonstrated in the analysis
and simulation studies.

3.1 Hiding Capacity and Watermark Domain Selection
In the SS hiding schemes as indicated by (2.5) and (2.6), the principle is very simple,
viz , to superimpose a small value random sequence into the original coefficient
sepuence. This idea can be applied in different domains, wavelet domain. DUCT
or spatial domains. What decomposition should be used in watermarking? Which
transform, high Gird or low

ETC

(Gain of Transform Coding) is more advantageous?

To be resilient to a specific compression, is it necessary to match the decomposition
used in the compression?
3.1.1 Hiding Capacity in Different Watermark Domains
In the following analysis, the simple superposition algorithm is studied,
x = sib + x i ,

(3. 1)

where s is the watermark signal sequence.
In the SS modulation, it is obvious that escrow applications will reach higher
capacity than oblivious ones. Moulin et al. [61] pointed out at least in theory
oblivious application could achieve the same capacity as in escrow ones. Nevertheless
this is not realizable in practice.
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In escrow applications, if the attack noise w is Gaussian distributed, w
N(0, a 2 ). The hiding capacity on one coefficient is simply given by

1log(1 +

C

0_2

(3.2)

where a is the watermark signal energy. The capacity is achieved when s is
Gaussian distributed, s — N(0, s )
Besides processing attack noise, the cover signal itself is also regarded as noise

(host noise) in oblivious cases. This noise is much larger than the channel noise. Both
of these two noises should be considered in the capacity calculation. Host noise is
usually non-Gaussian distributed. Ramkumar and Akansu used an information
transformer to convert the noise to Gaussian distribution. The parallel channel model
depicted in Figure 3.1 is used in their capacity calculation.
Suppose a watermark signal coefficient s ib is embedded in the cover signal
coefficient x i , and the processing noise is p i . Assume all the noise is Gaussian
distributed. In the ith channel, the capacity is calculated as
Cif

= 1—log(1 +
2

2

p
2

si
2 )

ape

(3.3)

where o pi is the channel noise variance, s ib N(0, asi ) and x iV 0, a x2 i
-

X,

Figure 3.1 Parallel channel model
Because a - xi > ape , the channel processing noise effect is neglected for simplicity
in the following capacity calculation.
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The total capacity is the sum of the capacities in these N parallel channels

C ti

2

E

og(1 +
xis

a3 .6)

).

a

For embedding in spatial (or time) domain, or other low GTc transform
domains, the parallel channel assumption may not be appropriate. "Parallel"

im plies the noise x i is independent. Whereas in spatial or time domain, there
is strong correlation between x i and (for images, correlation coefficient p is
usually larger than 0.9). The correlation means that the host noise is, more or less,
"predictable". Therefore, the correlated channel is not as "harmful" as the parallel
channel. More information may be transmitted through the correlated channel. For
example, based on a3.3), if 0.1 bit can be hidden on one pixel, on a 256x256 image
more than 256x256x0.1 bits can be hidden,
In fact transform does not change the entropy of the host noise x. Suppose x
is Gaussian distributed, but not necessarily independent. Its entropy is

f (x)log[f (x)]dx,

H i (x) = —

a3.5)

where f ax) is the pdf of x,

f ax) =

1

1

( 2 Br) N / 2 C

exp(-1/2

2x

T

C -1 x),

(3.6)

where C = varax) is the variance matrix of x.
If the transform kernel is A, transform output is obtained as y = Ax. The
variance matrix of y is

D = vary] = ACA T .

a3.7)

The entropy of y is obtained as
H2

ay)

=f g(y)log[g(y) dy,

(3.8)

where gay) is the pdf of vector y
gay)

=

1
(27)N/2

-expo

D

1/2

1
2- y AD lye)

a3.9)
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After the transformation, it can be derived that g(y)dy = Jlf(x)dx where J
is the Jacobi matrix. In this linear transform, it is easy to see J = A, AA T = I,
therefore,
xTC-a)YTA,D_1ly3=.(0
Note C D , dz = du. Therefore,

H i (x) = 112(y)• a3.11)
The entropy conservativeness holds even for non-Gaussian pdf. Comparing
a3.5) and a3.8), it is easy to see g (Ax) = f (x) as long as AA T = I.
In oblivious watermarking, host signal is considered noise. The larger the noise
entropy, the more "harmful" the noise is. The negative effect of host noise can not
be reduced by taking a transform. intuitively, observing an image I in different
domain should give us same information. To embed an information source s in x is
epuivalent to embedding a source As in Ax where A is the transform kernel. Same
information is transmitted. This correlation should not be neglected in capacity
calculation, watermark embedding and detection. Depovere et al. 21 proposed a
better detection approach by whitening filter before correlation.
Taking transform should not affect the hiding capacity theoretically. Actually
hiding capacity calculation does not shed much light on the decomposition selection
in practice. Even the higher capacity does not guarantee more reliable information
transmission using the current hiding schemes. For example, it is believed Laplacian
channel is of higher capacity compared with the Gaussian channel aGaussian is
regarded as the "worst" noise). However, using the antipodal or Mary modulation,
signal transmission through Gaussian channel could be more reliable. The Bit Error
Rate aBER) is determined by the "tail" of the noise pdf curve. Gaussian pdf decreases
at the order of e -X2 , faster than the Laplacian pdf e - x. That results in more reliable
transmission through Gaussian channel at higher SNR.
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Transform selection is a subtle issue in practice.

In face of a specific

compression, is it favorable to match the decomposition used in the compression?
This question is addressed in the following section.
3.1.2 Decomposition Selection in Presence of Compression

The channel noise is mainly introduced in compression in escrow cases. The
compression noise is expressed as

Ai = xi — Q(xi), (3.12)
where Qa.) is the quantization operator.
The coefficient x i is approximately Laplacian distributed before quantization
operation. If data embedding and extraction is done in the same compression
transform domain, the compression noise is puite close to uniform distribution,
AiU(-6/ 2, (5/2) where 6 is the quantization step size.
In a transform domain other than the compression domain, the compression
noise d i is not uniformly distributed. Experiments reveal that it is close to Laplacian
distribution. It is reasonable to assume the noise is i.i.d. The SS modulation
approaches in both of these mismatch and match domains are epuivalent to PN
sepuence signal transmission through two channels, one is uniform channel and the
other is Laplacian channel. If the mostly used correlation is employed at receiver, it is
observed that the Bit Error Rate aBER) in the Laplacian channel is superior to that
in the uniform channel aFig. 3.2). In simulation the antipodal signal is transmitted
in channels with different noise statistic properties.
It is true that the correlation detection is not optimal in a uniform channel case.
Further analysis shows that the optimum detector needs to know the quantizer step
size which is usually unavailable in practice. Correlation, although not optimal, is
still widely used in practice. The noise energy is not changed in the Laplacian and
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uniform channels. Still a transform changes the channel noise property. Correlation
detection is more reliable in Laplacian channel than the uniform channel.
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Figure 3.2 BER-SNR in Gaussian, Laplacian and Uniform channels
The SS scheme performance in oblivious applications in different GTc domains
is studied next. The following deep embedding scheme 16] is used in simulation,
{

xi + Wig x•la, to hide bit value 1
Xi — Wig x i a, to hide bit value 0

(3.13)

where w is the random bipolar sepuence aw ig is +1 or —i) and a is the distortion
threshold ratio.
Given a received sepuence r, the decoder used is also of correlation type
N-1
g

N-1
=

N-1
Wiwi

NWiw

a3.16)

i=o -

If q > 0, bit value 1 is decided; Otherwise bit value 0 is decided instead.
First, the host coefficients in the time domain are generated. The cover signal
x is a highly correlated ARai) sepuence with correlation ratio p = 0.9. Second, the
embedding and extraction s repeated in the time and DUCT domain. The distortion
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ratio is selected as a = 0.1 in experiments. Simulation result in Figure 3.3 demonstrates that time domain embedding is more reliable than that in the DUCT domain
embedding.
An intuitive explanation for the above result is that in time domain, the
coefficients, although highly correlated, is evenly distributed. Whereas in the DCT
domain, much energy goes to the low frequency coefficients. These high amplitude
host noise coefficients exert uch negative effect on the decoding. Further studies
demonstrate improvements if these coefficients are skipped in embedding.
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Figure 3.3 Performance in DUCT and time domain embedding

The great concern in the oblivious case is host noise suppression. The linear SS
algorithms do not suppress the host noise very effectively. Some methods, such as set
partitioning [31, 27], Quantization Index Modulation [12_, etc. are more successful.
It is believed that a mismatched transform is more favorable in these schemes due
to the same reason.
3.1.3 Taking Advantage of Compression — an Example

From the above discussion, it is concluded that selecting higher

GTo

transform does

riot increase capacity and matching compression transform ausually high G TE ) does
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not enhance its resilience to compression. Then how to select am advantageous
watermark domain?
Bender At al. [7] are among the first to point out, "The key to successful data
hiding is the finding of holes that are not suitable for exploitation by compression
algorithm". A good hiding scheme should take advantage of the compression. The
watermark domain is not necessarily a transform domain. Some authors argue the
message should be inserted in a domain which is compression-conservative. A novel
scheme [2] was proposed to hide information in the eigen vectors of the correlation
matrix of a subimage. Because these values are almost unchanged after compression.
Just as mentioned in Chapter 2, embedding in DFT amplitude domain provides some
advantages due to its perceptual insignificance [71, 73
In Chapter 5, a noise substitution algorithm in audio data hiding is proposed.
The well advanced audio model sinA + traWsiAWt + WoisA [56, 96, 95 is explicitly
used in this scheme. This scheme modifies the noisy components without changing
the noisy perception. More details can be found in Section 5.6. In this scheme,
matching the decomposition brings some benefits due to the compression coefficient
sign conservative property.

3.1.4 Summary
Decomposition used in compression is to dc-correlate the signal. High de-correlation
is desirable in compression, although may not be suitable in steganography. For
SS schemes application in oblivious cases, mismatch the decomposition used in
compression is more favorable. Different transform selection does not have any
effect on hiding capacity. The extra computation in high Gyve decomposition in
compressions may not be well justified in data hiding.
The decomposition selection is a complicated issue in practice. For example,
audio watermarking in frequency domain is advisable because the psychoacoustic

26
model in transform domains can be conveniently used. In the design of a compression
resistant watermarking scheme, decomposition selection is related with embedding
scheme used. Mismatch decomposition is advisable in SS. For the noise substitution
scheme in audio data hiding, it is more favorable to match the compression decomposition.

3.2 SS Modulation and Correlation Detection
Although the SS scheme is first introduced in escrow applications, it works in the
oblivious cases where the original content signal is not available. In the data hiding
scheme (3.13), s ib and xi are independent. It is assumed that the first term in (3.16)
N-1

t=

szxi

O.

i=o

a3.15)

Compared with (2.6), the extra disturbing term degrades the detector
performance. It is true that t

0 if the sepuence length N is sufficiently large.

Obviously, this significantly reduces hiding capacity. In the following part, the
degradation is measured puantitatively 3 0].

3.2.1 Correlation Performance in SS Modulation
In the following discussion, the deep data hiding scheme mentioned in Section 3.1 is
studied. Its embedding and extraction is given by a3.13) and a3.16), respectively.
The host noise power is much larger than that of the channel noise in oblivious
cases. The channel noise is neglected for simplicity in the following discussion. Then
(3.16) is reduced to
N-1

NiWi =

i=o

xi wi +

a3.16)

Denote
p i = W iw i +

(3.17)
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Because w ig is either +1 or —1 p i = x i +

i

or p i = x i —

xi

Due to the

symmetry property of the pdf of x i the statistical distribution of p i does not depend
,

on the value of w ig . It has same mean value and variance as

xi a3.18)

yid = xi +

Suppose the original coefficient x i is i.i.d. and Gaussian distributed, x i

0,

). The mathematical expectation of y id is

x

00

E Yid] = 2

2 7o

x2
2
A 2a2 Mx =

a3.19)

71

-

The variation of yid is obtained as
ERA — E

YiD 2

=E

o-ct
(

, 2,

.

(3.20)

)

After some algebraic steps, the final result yields as

E (Yi - E [Y, )2]

(i

+

(1 2

)7

2 .(3,2

The test statistic q (3.16) can be assumed a summation of random variables y id
(3.18). For a large value of N, the distribution of q is approximately Gaussian

q

ti

N(1

N(a aN
-

+ cy 2) u 2)

(3,22)

In a similar fashion, while the bit value 0 is embedded the distribution of the
test statistic is given as

q

N(—o aN
-

-,

Nai + G 2 )o 2 ).
-

(3023)

If the decision threshold is selected 7 = 0, the Bit Error Rate

BER = Qa

a3.26)

where Q(.) is the Gaussian pdf tail integral function.
This analytical result matches the simulation output aFigure 3.6). c is selected
as 0.1 in simulation. Figure 3.5 demonstrates the BER versus sequence length N.
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With sequence length N = 200, BER = 0.1308. To achieve the reliability BER <
10 -6 , the sepuence length should be N > 3700.
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Figure 3.4 Correlation performance in SS modulation
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3.3 Optimum Detection and Linear Modulation

The above results demonstrate that the performance of the SS modulation schemes
is not satisfactory. The SS modulation performance limit in oblivious applications is
analyzed in this section.
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3.3.1 Maximum Likelihood Detection

The correlation detector is only optimal in white Gaussian noise environment but
not in the SS modulation scheme discussed above.
With bit embedding scheme a3.13), decoding is a hypothesis testing problem
{

Hid: r,i+=btxvadlue•1ksmd
HO: rbi•—=tvalude0ksxm

a3.25)

where k, = wia.
Given a received sepuence r, the Maximum Likelihood aML) ratio is
R = P(H1)
P(HO

(3.26)

If R > i, the bit value 1 is decided; Otherwise bit value 0 is decided.
Assume the original coefficient
-

f (rib H1) =

xi

is Gaussian distributed, its pdf

1 exp[
Lb(1+ki)2

(rib > 0)

expo b(1—ki) 2

<0) ib (r
(rib = 0)

‘/Tco- (14-ki)

-\7ro-(1—ki)
1

'iTra

a3.27)

In a similar fashion, f (r, HO) can be calculated.
Assume PaH0) = P(H1) and neglect the rare case where r ib = 0, the ML ratio
is
PPaaiirr,,

H1)

+kid
1+ki

HO)

• exp[-fi • Mak,)ri
exp[+,3 • Mack,)

0)
0)

a3.28)

where Ma.) is the sign function
M(x) =

+i, x > 0
—1, x < 0

(3.29)

and
(3.30)
=

2( + a)b 2ai

a) b.

a3.31)
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If one bit is embedded in a sepuence x, the MLA ratio a3.26) is obtained as
IV-1

R

1 — kid

N-1

• exp

II
)s
o 1 +.
k

i=o

—Mai ) Maki )

].

(3.32)

The above is the NIL optimum detector in the oblivious case and it yields better
performance. Yet the computation is puite extensive. Secondly, the calculation of 3
involves the value of o -2 , which is usually unavailable in practice. Some approximation
is needed to derive a suboptimal detector applicable in practice.
In a white sepuence s, it is reasonable to assume it has the equal number of
+1 and —1. One obvious observation in a3.32) is that for sufficiently large sepuence
length N

,

1

I

1 — kivseri

a3.33)

o 1 1- k )

Under this approximation, a suboptimal detector is obtained as
--s(r) • rib • Makin ).

a

3.3 6 )

i=o
If q > 0, it is decided that the bit value is

Otherwise the bit value 0 is

decided.
The suboptimal detector has a puite simple form and comparable complexity
as the correlation detector a3.16). Figure 3.6 shows the simulation result with visual
threshold ratio value a = 0.1. The suboptimal detector has lower BER compared
with correlation. Still it is inferior to the optimum detector due to the approximation
in a3.33).
The suboptimal detector (3.36) is in a form of variation difference distinction.
Any hiding scheme changes the statistical property of the original cover signal. From
the embedding operation (3.25), it is clear the main impact of hiding operation is
the change of variation of x. Intuitively, the detector based on the distinction of
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Figure 3.6 Correlation. suboptimal and optimum detection
variation outperforms the correlation detector where the decision is based on the
mean value.
The channel noise is not considered in the above discussion. Even taking it
into consideration, further simulation studies show the NIL and suboptimal detector
still outperforms the commonly used correlation detector.
3.3.2 Linear Modulation and Detection
It is demonstrated in simulation studies and mathematical analysis that the
suboptimal detector is inferior to the optimum detector. How can the performance
be further improved?
The data hiding procedure (3.13) can be slightly modified by removing the
absolute value operator. The data hiding hypotheses testing becomes
H1:
HO:

rib = xi +
Tic —

xi xis xis

, to embed bit value 1
to embed bit value 0

(

3.35)

where kid = Wilt (kid is either +a or — ).
After embedding, the variance is modified to
C)

1

(1

\
b
) be-

(3.36)
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or
(1

ct)b (7 b

(3.37)

In a way similar to the analysis in the last section, the ratio on rib is given by
Paris
Paris H1)

HO)

1— A,
) • expo
1 + kid

N —1

—Makin

ribs -y

a3.38)

i=o

And the final ML detector output is

R

=

N-1 Bari

HI)

i= P(ri HO)

a3.39)
.

All the coefficients can be divided into 2 sets. The variances of x is in Set A
are increased while those in Set B are decreased.
Statistically, the coefficient number in these two sets is epual. The generation
of the white sepuence can be controlled so that the coefficient count of A, = a is
epual to the count of kid = —a. That yields
1 — Ai
11 1+ Az= 1.

N-1

i=o

(3.60)

By simplifying a3.38), the detection test statistic is obtained as
N-1

q=7

i=o

E 8aA i ) • ribs .

(3.61)

Remove the factor -y, the test statistic is

q

=

(3.62)
ESet A

ESet B

If q' > 0, the bit value 1 is decoded; Otherwise, bit value 0 is decided instead.
That is the optimum detector in the linear embedding.
The performance can be further analyzed if only the host noise is considered.
Suppose irinthebSAsGauindtrbewhvaincpulstof3.6);
While acirin3Se.tbBf7s,d);buwihvarnce
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Denote

r=iEct

a3 .63)
E Set A

and
b

to =
riES et

O3 .6 6)

B

These two variables are spuare sum of Gaussian distributed random variables
which share the same probability property. It can be proved their distribution is of
=1N/2freFdomgfFistbun[40].
tic
i i1/1/b-1
tic• C

f(tic

•2m/2

T

772

O3.6 5 )

•F(M/2

For notation simplicity, denote
A, =

aa3,66)

m 2AT/b
• (211/ 2)
•

ei
-

and
O3. 6 7)

2ai4
Epuation (3.65) can be rewritten as
—1 —o
"

faA,)

•

A

A

O3.68)

where n = K2 = N/6.
Suppose the bit value 1 is transmitted, the Bit Error Rate (BER) is

BER = Pat < to) = Bo f ato)Mto

f+°c f
Jo

Bo

• Bo f ati)Mti

+40

to

to

A trill

-

Mt

O3.69)

into •

For an integer W, using

M

x

c-ax

an+ 1

,
[(axon + W

+ WOW — i)aax)n -b +

+ W!]

a3.50)
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and
/ +DC

o

in c - ' Mx =
1
an+

n!

a3.51)

after some algebraic steps, the final result is obtained as

BER = [a1 +

co

A o A 1 an

— 2)! +

Cif Co +

1)!

-

2

aCoCOn
a3.52)

The same result is obtained if bit value 0 is transmitted. Therefore, the average
Bit Error Rate (BER) is given by (3.52).
Equation (3.52) is the achievable performance in the linear modulation
approach. Figure 3.7 depicts BER calculated by (3.52) and the simulation output.
The distortion threshold ratio a is selected as 0.i and x i is Gaussian distributed with

a = 50. The analytical result is a perfect match of the simulation results. Compared
with the embedding and extraction scheme using absolute value operation, this
scheme achieves the same performance as the optimum detector and outperforms
the suboptimal detector. This detector is also easy to implement.
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Figure 3.7 Performance comparison in the linear modulation
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It is assumed the original coefficient x i is Gaussian distributed in the above
discussion. In many cases x i is a transform coefficient whose pdf is approximately
Generalized Gaussian or Laplacian distribution. The above ML detector a3.62) is
not optimum in this case. However, it still outperforms the correlation detector
commonly used.
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Figure 3.8 Analytical result in the linear modulation
The SS schemes are not puite effective in oblivious cases. Figure 3.8 depicts the
BER, at different sequence length with the distortion ratio a = 0.1 (corresponding
to —20MB distortion, very deep embedding). At sequence length N = 1000, BER =
3.91 • 10 -6 . To achieve up to BER < 10-6 , the sequence length should be N > 1800.
Please note the performance is even poorer for correlation detection. This is the
limitation of SS schemes.

3.3.3 Image Data Hiding Experiments
The above linear detection scheme can replace the existing SS hiding and extraction
schemes. In practice, the value of the distortion ratio a could be obtained from
empirical experiments or some more accurate perceptual models. For example, the
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distortion threshold ratio in audio signals can be calculated from a psychoacoustic
model.
In the experiments with image data hiding applications, first the mage is
decomposed into 66 subtends Second, the medium tends are selected and the
hiding scheme in (3.35) is employed. At decoder side, a3.62) is used to extract the
information. In those experiments, 32 bit is embedded in a 256x256 image. All
bits are extracted error-free. Experiments also show its robustness against JPEG
compression and other attacks.

(a) Original Lena

(b) Marked Lena

Figure 3.9 Lena image before and after embedding

3.4 Signature Sequence: Security and Synchronization
Similar to an encryption system, it is believed a mature watermark system should be
employed with a public algorithm and a private key. The key is the seed to generate
a random sequence. An attacker can try his best to "guess" a sepuence close to the
watermark sequence and remove it. This attack is referred to as "guessing" attack.
Besides security, another important factor is synchronization requirement on the PN
sepuence. Both the security of PN sepuence and its synchronization requirement are
investigated in this section. A random phase sepuence generation is proposed later.
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3.4.1 Security of Gaussian PN Sequence
White Gaussian Sequence
The white Gaussian sepuence is widely used in various watermarking schemes [7, 16].
The sepuence x is of white spectrum, x i Na0, x ) and x i is i.i.d. In a public scheme
scenario, an attacker knows the parameters a x and sepuence length N, only does not
know the random seed. In the guessing attack, a random sepuence y is generated.
The "closeness" between x and y is measured by correlation
=< x, y >=

a3.53)

xiyi•

If the correlation output is larger than a fixed threshold 7, the attacker assumes
that y is sufficiently close to x. By subtracting the sepuence y, a good proportion
of the watermark energy could be removed.
As a linear combination of y, the output q is Gaussian distributed
q(0,
N

N-1
K2

i=o

E x:2).

a3. 6)

The exact value of q is dependent on the individual signature sepuence x. For
a large value of sepuence length N,
(3.55 )

q_ = 0,
and

E [q 2

N o 4.

(3.56)
0

i=

The successful attack probability is

P aq > 7) = a

2)

.

(3. 57)

Some numerical result for white sepuences acorresponding to p = 0.0) is shown
in Table 3.i. It can be seen that the white sequences are puite secure against this
guessing attack. This conclusion is justified by the intuition that the white sepuence

i=o
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is the most "unpredictable". The white sepuence has a flat spectrum whereas most
cover signals are of low-pass type. Most high frepuency energy can be removed by
low-pass filtering. For example, in a typical audio signal, most energy is concentrated
between 0 - kHz. For an audio signal sampled at 68kHz, by suppressing frepuency
components over 6kHz, a smart attacker can remove 75% of the white watermark
signal energy without much noticeable distortion. The white sepuence although
secure, is less energy efficient.
Low-pass aLP) type random signature can keep most energy after low-pass
filtering attack. A simple colored PN sequence - AR(1) random process is analyzed
in the next paragraphs.
AR (1) PN Sequence

The first order AR(1) sequence x is expressed as
x i = pxi_i + Hui,

a3.58)

where
P

and Hui

0,

Pb) e_,

=

E

(3.59)

ux Cr 2

u i is i.i.d.

The attacker tries to generate a matching sepuence y randomly tesed on the
same ARai) model asuppose the value of p is public). Correlation output a3.53)
measures the success of this attack. It can be easily shown that
E[V]=<x,y>0.

a3.60)

The variation of correlation output V is
ENV] = El(xoyo + xiyi +...+xi-

(3.61)

Using
E
and

a3.62)
x

i

ENx

(3.63)
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Equation T3.61) is reduced to

E[V b ]= N + 2(L — 1)p b 2aL — 2)p 42pL-1.
After some algebraic steps,

P

=

e-

EV

ie final result is obtained as
i
2
N p 2i

2N

pb

ai

P

02)2 1

N.

(3.66)

a3.65)

For a sufficiently large value of sepuence length N , the above can be further
expressed as
0-2 aN

where
2

=

T3.66)

2

1.

K

(3.67)

Similarly , the successful guessing attack probability yields as

PTV > 7) = Q(

= Q(

(3.68)

- i2) '
fc—
tiVcr

Compared with the white sepuence, the Aft(1) sepuence length should be
increased by a factor

lI

to reach the same security level. For example, for the case

where p = 0.8, a = 6.56, a 656-coefficient ARTi) sepuence is of the same robustness
as a 100-coefficient white sepuence.
Table 3.1 shows the successful attack protebility for different p and N values.
The result reveals that the LP type signal is more vulnerable to the guessing attack
due to the correlation between x i . However has some desirable properties, one is
the relaxed synchronization repuirement at decoder.

p = 0.0
p = 0.5
p = 0.8

N=30
2.16 • 10 -8
3.98 • 10-24
1.00 • 10 -b

N=60
7.62 • 10 -24
6.57 • 10-17
1.10 • 10-8

N=600
2.75 • 10 -86
8.66 • 10-5
1.08 • 10-17

Table 3.1 Sepuence security comparison

=
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3.4.2 Synchronization Effect on Detection

In SS modulation, it is well known the decoder is extremely sensitive to synchronization [87]. As it will be seen. the LP type sepuence is less sensitive to synchronization, which is often a desirable property in practice.
White Gaussian Sequence

Suppose a signal x is transmitted through a Gaussian channel,
Fri= xi + a3.69)

where zip is the channel noise, z ipN(0, o-zb).
If the sepuence is perfectly matched, the decoder output SNR can be shown to

be
(3.70)
If the received sequence r and x is not perfectly matched, SATR

0. The

watermark verification completely fails.
AR(1) Random Sequence

For an ARa1) sepuence generated by a3.59), although the output SNR degrades
if r and x are not perfectly synchronized, there is some signal energy residue in the
correlation detector output. If x and r is synchronized, ARai) sepuence performs as
well as the white sepuence. In the case where it is misaligned by M sample slip shift,
the filter output SNR is given by
SNR =

N-M)

2 2

x

No

(3.71)

Figure 3.10 depicts the SNR output value versus misalignment. The parameters
selected are N = 100, p = 0.8, a x = Hz . Obliviously, the AR(1) sequence is less
sensitive to synchronization than the white sequence.
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Figure 3.10 ART1) correlation output vs. misalignment
3.4.3 Sequence Spectrum Shaping

The white sepuence and LP type sepuence are studied above. The ARa1) sepuence
is just a special case of a colored sepuence. A more general colored sequence can be
generated by an AR(M) model
Al
Xi

=

hiXi_i

wig,

(3.72)

i=i

where wig is white Gaussian noise and x i is Gaussian distributed, independent
with wig . The above ARaM) colored sepuence can be interpreted as the white sepuence
shaped by a LP filter.
Although the white sequence is more secure than a LP type sepuence, this is
only true when no attack is present. The low-pass filtering attack can remove the
watermark energy in high frequency tends without much artifacts. A smart attacker
may combine the low-pass filtering and guessing attack therefore compromise its
security down to the level in the LP sequence. The watermarking energy spanning
the whole spectrum is not well spent, resulting in energy inefficiency.
It is pointed out in the face of Wiener filtering, the spectrum of the watermark
signal should be proportional to that of the cover signal N86]. In this case, the
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filtering is nothing but a scaling operation. This implies no gains achieved in this
attack. Actually, watermark signal power spectrum XaH) need not to be exactly
proportional to the cover signal spectrum NTH), but should be close to NaH). Since
the cover signal spectrum N(H) is public, the randomness mainly lies in the phase.

Cover Signal Spectrum

Frequency

Figure 3.11 Watermark spectrum against' iener filter i g
3.44 Random Phase Sequence
The random pfiee sepuence can be easily generated in DUI domain. '_Sup

se

(no

Appoint DFT transfer m of the watermark signal ..Tan) is, I ETA' A rand Wm phase
sequence Oil is generated by a private key. O il is i.i d. e i~ U(O, 270) and satisfies the
odd symmetry property
Lk =

O or Tic k = 0,
Lkk = 1, 2, — 1
—LA- V/b

i
2

1

i
2

(3.73)
+2

''''

N—

The embedding and extraction operations may be in time or DFT domain.
The watermark sepuence in FFT domain is generated as
x(k) = expaj0k). (3.76)

In the security analysis against the guessing attack, the cover signal spectrum
is assumed brick-shape for simplicity (Figure 3.12).
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Figure 3.12 Brick-shape LP watermark spectrum

Suppose the attacker randomly generates a phase sequence ,13, the correlation
between these two vectors are
M-1
V

Both °A and

Lk

=E

-oak)

A

M-1

-

0

k ) = 2 12 cosT/3A — LAB),

(3.75)

A=o

A=o

are uniformly distributed in the range 0, 27). The mathematical

expectation of t A = coM (,3A — LAB ) is
27r
EN

coM (OAF — Ok

1
27

=O.

(3/6)

The deviation of t A is
27r

E[t2 —

COS aai3A - 8k )

1

= -

2

27r

(3,77)

For a large number of Al, V is approximately Gaussian distributed. Its distribution can be shown to be V — N(0, M). The successful guessing attack probability
is

T3.78)

P(4> 7 ) C 2 T 07
7

For different values of M=30, 60 and 1O0, with the threshold value selected
as = 2M, the successful attack protebilities are 2.16 x 1O
7.62 x 10 -24 , respectively.

-8

6.76 x 1O -18 and
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The signal component in the correlation detection output is 2M without
misalignment. The mathematical analysis shows that with p(p O) sample shift,
the correlation output is
Bp = ±

coM 2P TII

1)

1 — cos

2

M

coM 27TNP 111

(3.79)

Figure 3.13 shows the output vs. misalignment. The sequence length is M = 3O
and N = 2O0.

-20
-40

-30

-20

-20

0

20

20

30

40
Misalgnmet)

Figure 3.13 Correlation output vs. misalignment

The sepuence length N and sepuence tendwidth Tindicated by M) are two
important parameters in sepuence generation. Larger N implies enhanced security
against guessing attack; while smaller M lowers the security level and relaxes the
synchronization requirement. Compared with Gaussian sepuence, this signature
provides a trade-off between security and synchronization repuirement.
In the random phase sepuence, the sepuence frepuency shape is fixed, only the
phase is random. Every sepuence has exactly the same energy. In practice, it may
riot be necessary to keep the sequence spectrum strictly brick-shape. Aarious visual
models could be applied to control the distortion visibility.
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3.4.5 Summary
The security and synchronization of the white and colored sepuence is analyzed in
this section. Although white sepuence is often used in the literature, the colored
sequence is superior to a white sepuence due to its energy efficiency. The wider the
tendwidth of the sepuence, the more secure it is against guessing attack and more
sensitive to synchronization. The random phase sepuence whose security lies in its
DFT phase is robust against Wiener filtering attacks.

CHAPTER 4
NONLINEAR MODULATION IN OBLIVIOUS STEGANOGRAPHY

In Chapter 3, it is concluded that the Spread Spectrum modulation algorithms have
limitations in oblivious applications due to its poor host noise suppression. In this
chapter some nonlinear embedding schemes are investigated N27, 29, 31 . These
schemes are more effective in oblivious cases.

4.1 Set Partitioning in Oblivious Data Hiding
4.1.1 Hypothesis Testing and Set Partitioning
Watermark is motivated to verify the disputed copyright ownership. Given a
multimedia content cover signal, the decoder needs to answer the puestion Yes/No
awatermarked or original) or bit value 1/O depending on a set of received coefficients.
It is a hypothesis testing problem in essence.
Suppose c is an original coefficient in some watermark domain, 1 bit is
embedded in c. The received coefficient is denoted as r. Two hypotheses are
HOB: bit value O is embedded in r
H1: bit value 1 is embedded in r
{

T6. 1)

Obviously, HO and Hi have different statistical properties. Any steganography
scheme modifies the original signal properties in one way or another. Based on the
property distinction, the decoder decides whether the bit value is 1 or O.
A good watermarking (data hiding) algorithm should modify the statistical
property of a cover signal without much perceptual degradation. There are several
approaches to modify the statistical property. Ramkumar and Akansu et al. N7O
proposed an innovative approach to flip the signs of some small value coefficients
in an image. Statistically speaking, an unmarked original image has approximately
epual number of positive and negative coefficients, while the watermarked image has
46
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noticeable count difference between positive and negative coefficients. The decision
is made based on this difference. Patchwork 7, 16 and many other schemes change
other statistical properties.
To answer the above hypothesis testing problem, a natural question is, how
can the decoder make a reliable decision Hl/HO merely on a given r? Begin with
the simplest case where no noise exists, answer is simple and straightforward, make
HO and H1 have no element in common. Thus, decoder can always make a correct
decision.
This embedding works well in a noise-free scenario. Yet in a practical noisy
environment, detection is not as reliable as in noise-free cases. To increase its
robustness to noise, the element in HO and H1 should he simply kept some distance
apart_ That is the simplest way to "separate' them.
This simple idea is extended to the following heuristic data hiding scheme It
is simple yet effective. Two separate sets are constructed on the real axis TFigure
6.1). The embedded coefficient value x should be kept in a set according to the bit
value to be hidden. To embed bit value 1, the output coefficient x should be kept in
set 1. If the original value c is already in set 1, no modification needed. Otherwise
it is replaced by the nearest element in set 1. Similarly after embedding bit value O,
x should be kept in set O.

Set 0

Set I
di

Set 0

Set I

Set 0

Set 1

d

Figure 4.1 Set partitioning scheme
To enhance embedding and extraction reliability, usually one bit information
is embedded in a coefficient sepuence c. To do that, it is need to define a deter-

48
ministic pattern to represent bit values, For example, to embed 1 bit in a 5-coefficient
sepuence, patterns similar to antipodal signaling can be defined as
Pattern
Pattern

A (bit 1): [set 1, set 0, set 1, set O, set 1
-A abit O): Nset O, set 1, set O, set 1, set O]

a6.2)

To hide an information bit, the modified sepuence x should comply with Pattern
A ato hide bit 1) or Pattern -A Tto hide bit O). For example, to hide bit value 1,
after embedding the output coefficients should be
4EsxietO32oand1.,

This method is named sAt partitioning. It does not hide a specific watermark
signal in a cover signal, but try to modify its statistical property to facilitate the
detection at decoder. Watermarking is a game played between robustness and
distortion. The more distortion it introduces, the more reliable it could be.
4.1.2 Average Distortion

In the calculation of the distortion energy, for simplicity, it is assumed the original
coefficient c is uniformly distributed in the region a—a, a). This assumption is true
for the data in spatial or time domains, although may not accurate for coefficients
in transform domains. It is reported the coefficients are approximately Laplacian
distributed 5 Simulation studies show that distortion difference due to the pdf is
negligible.
Denote the error introduced in embedding as A = x — c. As depicted in Figure
6.2, suppose the bit value 1 is to be embedded, consider the typical region AD:
If c is in the range AB, no modification needed, A = O.
If c is in the range BD, e is uniformly distributed in (—M — M1K2,M + d1/2).

The corresponding conditional protebilities can be expressed as
P(c E AB c E AD) =

Ml
2M1 + 2M

a6.3)
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and
Pac E BD/c E AD) =

2d + d1
9d1 + 2M

T6.6)
.

Therefore, the average distortion energy introduced is

+ dl) (2d + dl) b
D = (2M
a2d1 + 2d)
12

1 (2d + d1) 3
12 T2d + 2d1)

a6.5)
.

In a similar fashion, the distortion calculation yields the same result if bit value
O is embedded. Th average is just given by (6.5).
Set 1

Set 0

Set

Scl I

1—
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di

Scat I
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D

Figure 4.2 Average distortion calculation
4.1.3 Hard Decision Detection

In one bit per coefficient embedding, the hard decision is based on the distance
between the received coefficient r and the two sets ahere distance is defined as the
minimum distance between r and any element in the set, it is zero if r belongs to
the set).
In practice, it is rare to embed one bit in one coefficient. Consider the case
where 1 bit is embedded in an I-coefficient sequence c. The simplest detection is
majority vote. This is the hard decision based on individual coefficient. Real axis
is divided into two decision regions TFigure 6.3). If the received coefficient r falls in
Region 1, it is decided the transmitting signal x comes from set 1. Otherwise it is
assumed it comes from set O. In the example discussed in Section 6.1.1, if a received
sequence pattern is set 0, set O, set 1, set O, set O], which is more similar to pattern
A (2 coefficient difference) than to Pattern -A a3 coefficient difference), the decision
is made in favor of bit value 1.
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Figure 4.3 Hard decision region
4.1.4 Maximum Likelihood Detection
The above simple detector makes decision tesed on the individual coefficients.
Detection reliability can be enhanced using a soft-decision detector.
Denote r as the received coefficient after Gaussian channel transmission, noise
n

N(0, crab ). The NIL likelihood ratio 68
P ax E set 1 A)

R

(4.6)

P (x E set O r)

In hose two sets, there are infinite transmitting signals. Denote any element
in these two sets as (set 1) and

T

(set O), and rewrite the above epuation,

t 1 PO)
R _ Eease
.

A)

(6.7)

Per O

ETaset

Using
P

=

P(e) f

f (A)

(6.8)

and
PDT) f

PDT

DA T)

f aA)

(6.9)

Epuation (6.6) becomes

t 1 P(e) f (A
E
R Pease
ETEset 0 P(7)f T)

D6.1O)

Gaussian noise probability density function is
Pre) =

1

expN
-\/27ro-

A, — )A
A90-b

a 6.11)
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The original coefficient c is uniformly distributed, its probability density
function fac) c U(-a, a). After embedding information bit value 1, the
calculation of the probability of the transmitting signal Pee) is depicted in Figure
6.6. Note the protebility pulses at the end points. They are transmitted with
greater protebility because any c out of the set 1 is replaced by the end points.
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d + •• •

a6.12)

Figure 4.4 Calculation of ML ratio
In the similar manner, Teset 0 PaT)fTr T) can be calculated and yields a result
similar to (6.12). Still a closed-form result of ML ratio can not be obtained. The ML
detector is also too computation expensive. Besides, the detector needs the value
of the noise power o-b , which is usually unavailable at decoder. The ML optimum
detector is infeasible in practice.
The challenge in the decoding is that the transmitting signals could be any value
belonging to these two sets. The ML ratio calculation thus involves all elements in
set 1 and set 0. A way to simplify detection is to assume transmitting signals finite.
In the following suboptimal methods, the transmitting signals are assumed discrete
instead of continuous.
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4.1.5 Suboptimal Detection

In the first suboptimal detection, the transmitted signals are simply assumed at the
center of the continuous segments, the signaling is a pattern like xoxo as depicted in
Figure 4.5. Signal points x and o are transmitted with epual protebility.
After approximation, the NIL ratio can be expressed as:

R=

P(x E set 1r)
P(x E set 0 r)

(4.13)

Still there are many x and o points to be considered.
Simulation studies demonstrate that it can be further simplified by merely
considering the nearest x and o points (See the Section 4.2). Thus, (4.13) reduces to

R=

P(rx u)

PaA x = v)'

aa4.14)

where n/v is the nearest transmitting points x o in set 1 and set O.
No v the suboptimal detector s in a form of minimum distance detector. Only
-

the nearest transmitting points are considered due to their higher transmitting protebilities.
Some other assumptions result in a different form of suboptimal detectors. In
Figure 6.6, it is observed that the endpoints are transmitted with higher protebilities because those original coefficients not in the two sets are replaced by the
end points. Another easonable approximation assumes the transmitted signals have
xxoo pattern as shown in Figure 4.6.
In that case, it is reasonable to assume that only the nearest end points are
considered as transmitting signals, that yields the same results as (4.14).
Set I

Set 0

Set I

Set 0

e
Suboptimal Detection 1

Figure 4.5 Suboptimal detection 1

Set 1
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Set 1

Set 0

Set 1

Seto

Set 1

k
Suboptimal Detection 2

Figure 4.6 Suboptimal detection 2

In the example mentioned in Section 4.1.1, suppose a 5-coefficient sepuence r
is received. The nearest x and o points to ri are located and denoted as nib (in Set
1) and v i (in Set 0). According to the given patterns (A and -A), two corresponding
sequence candidates are constructed,

P

43b1n,aater=ANynvpoE:
Pattern -A type: b = vo , nib, v2, U31 v4

If r — a

1<

a4.15)

r — 131 , the received sepuence is more similar to the Pattern A,

bit value 1 is decided; Otherwise, bit value 0 is decided.
The two suboptimal detectors demonstrate different performance.
4.1.6 Experiments and Results

To evaluate this set partitioning scheme, the extracted Bit Error Rate (BER) in
Gaussian noise environment versus the distortion introduced is measured. The
Signal-Noise Ratio (SNR) is redefined as the ratio of the distortion energy S over
the noise power a b .
SNR

s

=—

(4.16)

The three detectors are compared One information bit is embedded into an
11-coefficient sepuence (Fig. 4.7). The ratio is selected d/dl = 1. The result shows
that suboptimal detector 2 outperforms suboptimal detector 1. Further simulation
shows decoding performance in suboptimal detector 2 is almost the same as the
ML optimum detector. Both suboptimal methods far outperform the hard decision
decoder.
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It is observed that BER-SNR is different for different M and Ml values. The
determining factor is the ratio d/dl, not individual values of d or dl. Figure 4.8 is
the result of embedding 1 bit in an 8-coefficient sepuence.
In practice, an accurate prediction of the channel noise property may not be
known in advance. However, data hiding seldom works at higher SIR, usually

SNR < 1. Embedding distortion is not expected to be larger than the moderate or
severe compression distortion. Therefore, smaller d/dl is more favorable in applications. That implies the smaller d/dl is more reliable in noisy scenarios.
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Figure 4.7 Detection performance comparison
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Figure 4.8 Performance with different d/dl
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The set partitioning scheme may be used in place of the SS modulation in
various watermark domains. It shows great advantage in host noise suppression. In
image data hiding experiments, information bits are embedded in the DFT amplitude
domain. A pattern is embedded in the medium frequency coefficients. Total 64 bits
are hidden in a 256x256 images. Experiments demonstrates its robustness against
common compression and other attacks.

4.2 QIM Embedding and Detection

Chen and Wornell At al. [12, 11] applied dither modulation technipue as a special
case of Quantization Index Modulation aQIM) for oblivious watermarking. It can
achieve more reliable extraction without referring to the original cover signal.
4.2.1 QIM in Oblivious Data Hiding

In the SS modulation schemes, a fixed watermark signal is superimposed on the
original signal. The set partitioning scheme modifies a coefficient only when necessary
thus minimizing the distortion. There are several approaches to hiding information
in the oblivious applications. The greatest challenge is that the original signal is
unknown. If a good estimate of the original signal is obtained, the detection reliability
will be boosted.
Given a received coefficient 'r what is the original value? It is reasonable to
,

assume the original value must be close to r. A good estimate of the unknown
original is its quantized version Q(x, 5) where b is the quantization step size. The
difference between the "estimated cover signal" and the received coefficient x is the
small value signal embedded which could be extracted as
M = Q(x,(5)— x.

(4.17)
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After fixing the signal extraction method, the corresponding invertible embedding
operator is not difficult to find as
x = Qac + 8,6) — M,

a4.18)

where c is the original coefficient, x is the marked coefficient after embedding
and M is the watermark signal.
The invertibility of encoding and decoding can be demonstrated by the
following example. Suppose an antipodal signal M or —M is to be embedded
to hide information bit value 1 or O. If the original value c = 26.40, quantization step size 6 = 1.0 and watermark signal M = 0.25, the marked coefficient
x = Q(c + M, (5) — M = Qa26.65, 1.0) — 0.25 = 26.75. In a noise-free scenario, the
extracted signal is again M' = Q(x, (5) — x = 27.00 — 26.75 = 0.25.

4.2.2 Maximum Likelihood Detection in QIM
The embedding operator (4.18) and extraction operator (4.17) are invertible in noise
free scenario. The final decision could be tesed on the correlation value of the
extracted signal and the watermark signal. Yet it is far from optimum in noisy case.
Continue with the above example, suppose the bit value 1 is embedded, the
marked coefficient x = 26.75. After noise channel, if received value Al = 26.51,
the extracted signal M' = Q(rl, 6) — Al = 0.49. If r2 = 26.49 is received instead,
M' = QaA2, 6) — A2 = —0.49! TO and r2 are puite close, nevertheless results in two
totally different extracted signals. The reason is that the quantization operation is
nonlinear and has discontinuity around the points xxx.50.
The quantization operator is not necessary. In this scheme, it is needed to
decide a received coefficient r comes from x points or from o points. The Maximum
Likelihood (ML) ratio is 481

R=

P (x E Set 1 r)
P E Set 00'

If R > 1, the bit value 1 is decided; Otherwise bit value 0 is decided.

a4.19)
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The protebility calculation is a little complicated. There exist many signal
points corresponding to one information bit. On a received coefficient A, it is known
that the transmitted signal x could be xxx.75 or xxx.25. Suppose A = 6.30 is received,
all the possible transmitted signals can be divided into two sets.
{

Seat 1 :
Set 0 :

{6.75, 5.75, 7.75, 8.75, 4.75, ...}
{6.25, 7.25, 5.25, 8.25, 4.25, ...}

E4.20)

Set 1 represents information bit value 1; Set 0 represents bit value 0.
If the noise is Gaussian distributed, its pdf is

f Ex) =

1

—X

2

E4.21)

expE ).
27o 2a2
-

The protebility PEx E set 1, A) can be calculated as

PEx E set 1 A)PEA) = P(A = 6.301x = 6.75)PEx = 6.75)
+PEA = 6.30x = 7.75)PEx = 7.75)
+PEA = 6.30 x = 5.75)PEx = 5.75)
+...

(4.22)

PEx E set OA)P(r) can be obtained as well.
Assume the probabilities for all transmitting signals are epual

PEx = 6.75) -= PEx -= 6.25) = Pax = 5.75) =-

E4.23)

Epuation E4.19) can be reduced to

R

—

= 6.30 x = 6.75) + PEA = 6.30 x = 5.75) +
PEA = 6.30 x = 6.25) + PEA = 6.30 x = 7.25) +

E4.24)

The above epuation involves many terms, no closed-form result can be obtained.
The dominating element in each set is defined as lAader. In the above example, the
leaders in Set 1 and Set 0 are n = 6.75 and v = 6.25. They are the most likely
candidates. If all the remaining terms are neglected, the ML ratio E4.24) becomes
R

PEA n)
PEr v)

expN -(r2

)2

]

eXPNN

)2

1

2,2

(7'

E4.25)
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Simulation shows the above is a good approximation for Gaussian noise
environment. The result is similar to that obtained above in set partitioning
calculation.
In fact, the idea of AIM has long been used in some watermarking algorithms.
It is similar to the parity manipulation schemes. Some schemes in this category
modify the parity of an integer coefficient c. For example, c can be modified to
an even number to embed bit value 1, or to an odd number to embed bit value 0
N2]. In fragile watermarking, the DUCT coefficients are modified in a similar way for
image authentication N100]. Its embedding procedure is, in essence, the same as AIMS
scheme. The detection used usually is hard decision detector, i e. a majority vote.
In the above example, if even integers out-count odd ones, bit value 1 is decided;
Otherwise it is decided O. It is inferior to the above soft decision suboptimal detector.
Figure 4.9 depicts the comparison results of the detectors: majority vote
detector, correlation using puantization operation and soft decision detector. The
original coefficient c if is Gaussian generated with variance a = 80. The soft decision
detector yields the better result over the other two.
0.2

0.18
ntization Detecto
0.16

Suboptimal Detector

0.14

Hard Decision Detector

C2

0

0.08

0.0

0.04

0.02

0
05

5

2.5
SNA

3.5
4
4.5
tale), sequence length=5

5

Figure 4.9 Detection performance in QIN4

5.5

6

59
4.2.3 Performance Analysis

From the above analysis, it is found that the AIM scheme is superior to the SS
modulation in oblivious applications. Chen et al. N11, 12] pointed out that BER in
AIM is calculated as
BEAR= QE2a). E4.26)
where M is the distance between the x and o points, a is the noise variance
value.
The analyzed BER value is the same as the non-periodic antipodal communications cases. This is true only when the SIRE value is very large. In most data
hiding applications where SIR is usually low, this periodic scheme is far from the
non-periodic scheme. BER in the non-periodic antipodal case is simply given by
(4.26).
The BER in AIM case is the shadowed area in Figure 4.10,
BER=

fd

1

c1/2)2dx +
2a2

(a) Periodic Signaling

bd

1

07ru

ALEX -I- C1/2) 2 Mx

2a2

E4.27)

(b) Non-periodic Signaling

Figure 4.10 BER calculation in AIM and antipodal case

The gap between AIM and antipodal cases is depicted in Figure 4.11. In the
antipodal case, the transmitting signals are fixed, M or —s. While in the AIM case,
there exist many transmitting signals, the decoder never knows for sure which is
the transmitted signal and has to "guess" one Ethe nearest one in the suboptimal
detectors). The performance degradation can be regarded as a price paid for the
"uncertainty" at decoder.
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4.2.4 Comparison With Set Partitioning

The AIM scheme can be viewed as a special case of the proposed set partiioning
scheme in Section 4.1. The latter provides the flexibility to choose different d and dl
values. The ratio value M/dl has different implications in practice. The performance
with different M/dl ratio values is compared with the QINI scheme EFigure 4.12 and
Figure 4.13).

Figure 4.12 Performance at lower SNR

Observe the BER-SKR curves for M/dl = 1, at lower SNR where most data
hiding applications are employed the improvement over AIM is noticeable. One may
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notice that with fixed average distortion energy, the set partitioning scheme has
larger maximum distortion amplitude. Even considering this, at a given maximum
distortion Ethat implies higher distortion energy in AIM), simulation studies show
the set partitioning scheme is still superior to the AIM. This is a puite effective
oblivious hiding scheme.
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Figure 4.13 Performance at higher SNR

Note that at different SNR the comparison result is different. Figure 4.12 and
Figure 4.13 show that the smaller d/dl performs better at lower SNR. At higher
SIR, larger d/d1 is more advantageous.

4.3 Limitations of Set Partitioning

As seen above, the set partitioning scheme is powerful in oblivious data hiding. The
AIM periodic scheme can be regarded as a special case of this approach. Nevertheless,
it has several limitations in watermarking applications. The latter just divides the
data into two sets and there is no other constraint for the set signaling. For example,
usually the relative distortion is much more important than the absolute distortion
for human perception. The set can be design with more distortion at the high value
end.
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Both the encoder and decoder know- the set signaling. Once the signaling of
the two sets is known, it is not difficult to remove the watermark. To enhance the
security, the signaling scheme should be kept secret. Ramkumar and Akansu et al.

72] proposed a QINI like scheme with a known signaling and a random transform.
Without knowing the transform, it is more difficult to remove the watermark. One
side effect is that in a random transform domain, it is difficult Eif not impossible) to
control the artifacts.
An alternative is to introduce randomness into the signaling by shifting the
set signaling. For example, instead of modifying the original coefficient c to comply
with a set pattern, the value of c p can be modified so that it complies with the
same pattern where p is a random variable. This may in some degree enhance its
robustness against attacks.
Even with the suitable transform, it is still a little difficult to control the
artifacts. In the cases where the signaling is adaptive to some perception control afor
audio signals, the permitted distortion in every subband is different), the decoder
should know the signaling change as well. Since the encoder has no way to notify
the change, the decoder has to "guess" the signaling used at encoder. This greatly
increases the computation complexity at decoder. A more severe problem is that
after sever compression, the signaling scheme estimated by decoder may be different
from the one used in data embedding. The message extraction is sensitive to this
"set signaling error".

CHAPTER 5
CONTENT PROTECTION IN AUDIO SIGNALS

In the previous chapters, multimedia data hiding in general is studied. In this
chapter, data hiding applications in audio signals are explored, and several algorithms
for compression-resistant hiding schemes are investigated.

5.1 Introduction to Audio Compression

In compression resistant data hiding design, it is important to understand the
compression algorithms. Better understanding of the compression can lead to a more
robust and effective scheme. In this section, popular audio compression schemes are
reviewed. The current multimedia compression methods can be roughly categorized
into three groups, wavAform approximation, perceptual coding and paramAtric coding.
5.1.1 Waveform Approximation Coding

The goal of the waveform approximation is to construct a compressed version closest
to the original waveform at a given bit rate. In other word, it aims at the highest SNR.
Usually, none or only very little perceptual knowledge is employed. One example is
the Adaptive Differential Pulse Code Modulation EADPCM). Other examples include
speech type narrow-band audio signal compression G.721 and G.723.
The schemes are also used in image compression where most schemes are after
the highest SNR. In current popular schemes, wavelet, sub-band or other various
filtering technipues are exploited to reduce the redundancy without much consideration of the Human Aisual System EHAS). Lots of research is focused on puantization procedure after filtering. Zerotree 82 , SPIRT 79] are some of the recent
achievements. In JPEG compression, tesic human perpetual knowledge (human
eyes are more sensitive to low frepuency components than to the high frequency
ones) is considered in A-table design. Still it is very simple and crude.
63
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This kind of compression is based on information rate-distortion theory.
MPEG-i and MPEG-2 video compression and various image compressions fall into
this category. The compression noise introduced is usually not very large.
5.1.2 Perceptual Coding

Perceptual coding is widely used in well-advanced audio compression. An outstanding
example is the advanced audio compression MPG which is ubipuitously used in
Internet transmission and storage.
It was realized that the waveform approximation coding schemes were not
successful in audio applications. The reason is multi-fold. The audio signal is "hard"
to compress. It is a kind of non-stationary signal, or at most a guazi-stationary signal.
Secondly, people do not measure "audio puality" by "square error" and Human Audio
System EHAS) is much more sensitive than the Human Aisual System EHAS).
To obtain high coding gain, popular audio compression schemes such as MP3,
MPEG-2 AAC-2, and Dolby AC-3, NTT Twin-VA, etc., all explicitly make full use
of the human psychoacoustic model. There have already existed several effective
psychoacoustic models. These models which are best described in transform domain
are used in puantization operation to shape the compression noise. Compared with
the waveform approximation, the compression in this group is much more efficient.
Although compression in this group is tesed on human perception, it uses quantization error as a distortion measure. In contrast, paramAtric coding does not use the
error as a puality benchmark.
5.1.3 Parametric Coding

Parametric coding is a complicated technique in audio compression. Some schemes
of this kind are standardized, for instance, in MPEG-4 parametric coding 1]. The
compression might achieve very high compression rate.
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The tesic principle in the compression is not to "encode" a signal but to
"describe" the signal. The original signal is analyzed and the parameters describing
the signal are extracted. These parameters are then encoded and transmitted. At the
decoder side, the audio signal is reconstructed with these parameters. Its waveform
may not be close to the original, and SIR may be very low. Still it presents the
same perceptual effects as the original.
Signal Analysis
and
Parameter Extraction

Parametric
Encoding

(a) Parametric Encoder

Signal
Synthesis

Reconstructed
Signal

(b) Decoder

Figure 5.1 Audio parametric coding

The encoder is composed of two parts, parameter extraction and parameter
encoding. The most complicated part is model-tesed parameter estimation. There
are several models underlying the compressions.
In the audio analysis, several different models are studied for parameter
estimation. In MPEG-4 parametric coding 1], the Harmonic and Individual Lines
plus Koise EHILN) tool is adopted for audio parametric coding. In this model, signal
is regarded as a combination of harmonic component Eone fundamental frepuency and
a couple of harmonic components), individual frequency lines and noise component.
It is claimed suitable for less complicated audio signals. An advanced audio signal
is modeled as 56, 94, 95
Audio=Sines + Transients + Noise
The sinusoidal waves are the most significant components in the audio signals.
The transients are broadband signals that do not have tonal peaks. They are also
referred to as attacks in audio compression. The last significant component is noise.
It is claimed this compression achieves the same perceptual effect at same bit rate
compared with most complicated perceptual coder MPEG-2 AAC. This model will
be revisited in some length in Section 5.7.
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5.2 MP3: A Typical Perceptual Audio Compression

MP3 EEMPEG-i Layer III) is a widely used audio compression algorithm. It has
become the standard in audio signal transmission and storage.
As a typical perceptual coding scheme, MP3 is composed of several blocks
TFigure 5.2). The time-domain waveform is transformed to the subtend domain
to remove the redundancy. The input signal also goes through psychoacoustic
analysis. The output is used to shape the quantization noise according to the masking
threshold curve. The final stage is bitstream formation.

PCM Input

Time-Frequency
Filter Mapping

Quantization
Bit Control

Bitstream

Encoded

Packing

Bitstream

Model Calculation
Puchoasti

Figure 5.2 A typical audio perceptual compression block
5.2.1 Sub-band Filtering and MDCT

The MPEG-i layer III is an extension of the MPEG-1 layer I and II. In the layer I
and II a polyphase filter bank is employed for time-frepuency mapping. The filter
,

tenk is composed of 32 filters, each with equal bandwidth. In Layer III, each output
channel is further subdivided into 18 tends via a windowed Modified Discrete Cosine
Transform EMDCT) for a better frepuency resolution.
A fine frepuency resolution is preferred for signal redundancy reduction, which
favors the long transform length selection. On the other hand, for the attack
signals Ttransients), quantization using long transform length tends to produce some
"spreading" effect in time domain. This makes the attack signal not so "crisp".
It is well known that the fine time resolution and frequency resolution can not be
achieved simultaneously. The transform length should be adaptive. For a stationary
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signal segment, long block is used. If an attack is present, short block should be
used instead. The decision to switch between long and short transform is tesed on
perceptual entropy first proposed in 47
subband 0

PolyPhase
Filter

subband 1
subband 2

MDCT
MDCT
MDCT

18
18
18

•

Bank

subband 3 1

•

MDCT

18

Figure 5.3 Subbing filtering and MDT

5.2.2 Frequency Masking
Human psychoacoustic model plays a very important part in perceptual coding.
The psychoacoustic studies have made significant progress in characterizing human
auditory perception and several perceptual models have been developed and applied
in audio coding.
Both subjective experiments and studies show that human ears perceive the
audio signal within an interval of time. The perception procedure is analogous to
the short-time spectral analysis. Distinctive regions in the cochlea perceive different
frequency components. These frequency partitions are called critical bands.
People tend to "mix" the effect of the frepuency components in one critical
tend. The subjective response to the components out of the critical band is abruptly
changed. Empirical work shows the human audible frepuency range is divided into
23 27 critical bands, each with different bandwidths. The critical bandwidths
are increasing towards the high frequency end. The distance of 1 critical band is
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referred to as 1 bark, which is a nonlinear measure scale used in psychoacoustics. An
empirical formula to convert from Hz to Bark scale is
zEf) = 13 • arctaWE0.00076f) + 3.5 • arctaWNENE

7 00
5 f

)2] (Bark)

a5.i)

Human frepuency masking takes place for inter-bands and intra-tends. Simply
put, a component Emasker) can "mask off" another component Emaskee), rendering it
less audible. Above some threshold value, the masker completely masks the maskee,
making it inaudible. The audibility masking value is called masking threMhold, which
is not only related to the loudness of the masker, but also to the "tonality" of the
masker. Psychoacoustic experiments reveal that the SMR ESignal-to-Mask Ratio) of
pure sinusoids is much larger than that of the white noise signal. In other words, a
noisy component is a better masker than a tonal component. If the compression noise
is completely under the "masking threshold curve" , it is inaudible. The
psychoauti sedocnrlthpuaiz ocedr.
Masker

A

Absolute
Threshold

Frequency (Hz)
Figure 5.4 Frequency masking effect
The psychoacoustics analysis in IP3 compression is a puite complicated
procedure. The Hann-windowed FFT complex spectrum of the input signal
is calculated. Then the unpredictability, which is a rough tonality measure is
calculated. The frequency bins are grouped into threshold calculation partitionM
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which are approximately one-third Bark band scale. The signal energy in each
partition is summed-up. With the obtained unpredictability measure, the partitioned energy is convolved with the spreading function which models the natural
excitation spreading along the basilar membrane in the cochlea. Subsepuently, the
actual energy threshold in one band is calculated and spread over all FFT lines.
Considering absolute thresholds, the final energy threshold of audibility is obtained.
Regrouping the threshold values into Mcale factor bandM Efrepuency bins in a same
tend share a same scale factor, resulting in an epual puantization resolution), and
the distortion threshold ratio is therefore obtained.

r=

allowed distortion energy
scale-factor band energy

E5. 2)

Figure 5.5 is a psychoacoustic analysis output in one granule. It is used in the
subsepuent puantization and puantization iteration processing.

Figure 5.5 Scale-factor tend distortion ratio
5.2.3 Temporal Masking

Temporal masking is the masking effect taking place in the time domain. HAS
system perceives the audio signal in an interval of time. The perceived effect is a
"sum-up" effect during the interval. The masker has both pre-echo and post-echo
effects in the time domain as depicted in Figure 5.6. The masker masks off the signal
whose londness is under the audibility threshold curve.
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Please note the masking effect is different in pre-masking and post-masking
regions. The pre-masking only lasts half a dozen milliseconds while post-masking
can extend to 50 300 milliseconds depending on the londness and duration of the
masker. Usually, only "pre-echo" effect is considered in compression.
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Figure 5.6 Temporal masking effect
The temporal masking effect is studied in audio coding to address the so-called
"re-echo" problem. Although the compression noise in frepuency domain can be
well shaped by employing the frepuency masking property, it is difficult to control
the puantization noise in time domain. In the transform coding the quantization
noise spreads in the time domain within the transform block, which could result
in audible compression noise. This only happens at attack Etransient) signals, for
instance, a castanet, or the beginning when a key is stricken. Based on temporal
masking property, the common remedy is the selection of sufficiently short transform.
MPG adopts transform length switch to solve the problem. The transform in MPG is
adaptive to the signal property. Most of the time the signal is regarded as stationary.
Long transform length is used for fine frepuency resolution Ethus higher coding gain).
At the time of the signal abrupt change Etransients), a short transform length should
be used to prevent pre-echo artifacts. The switch decision depends on perceptual
entropy [47] and it must be gradual for the perfect reconstruction purpose 44
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5.2.4 Quantization and Distortion Control
The MDCT coefficients are small floating-point numbers. All is multiplied by a
glotel gain. Besides, every MDCT coefficient in one scale factor band is multiplied
by a common scale factor. The MP3 puantization procedure is composed of two
loops -- - inner loop for bit rate control and outer loop for distortion control.

• Inner Iteration Loop: After quantization, the coefficient values are Huffmancoded. If the bit consumption is larger than the bits available, the global gain
is decreased by one step size so that puantization noise is increased and the
bit consumption is decreased. The operation repeats several times until the bit
consumption is less than the bits available.

• Outer Iteration, Loop: After the inner loops, the puantization noise is calculated
in each scale factor tend. If the noise is larger than the permitted distortion
obtained out of the psychoacoust c analysis, this scale factor in this band
is increased, resulting in finer puantization and less distortion. The requantization goes on until the noise is completely masked off.
This quantization operation is puite complicated. Usually, it takes 12-17 loops
to finish it. It is possible that the rate and distortion repuirements might not be met
at the same time. The iteration should be terminated according to other conditions,
for example, after a given maximum loops. The coding bits needed are not the same
for different segments in an audio signal. To absorb bit consumption imbalance, "bit
reservoir" technipue is employed. The current frame is permitted to "borrow" bits
saved from past frames, if necessary.
Figure 5.7 depicts the flow chart of NIP compression. The real compression
operation is quite complicated and is composed of the block and window length
switches and other algorithms for effective stereo signal coding. For more detailed
description on MP3, refer to Ni0, 23, 65
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Figure 5.7 MPG encoding flow chart
5.3 Amplitude Modulation Data Hiding

The spread spectrum modulation can be extended to audio applications as well [28].
In this section, this technipue in audio data hiding is employed and some results are
presented.
5.3.1 Hiding and Extraction

The data hiding scheme is the direct extension of the SS modulation widely used in
image and video applications. A small valued PN sepuence is embedded in the
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original signal. Suppose one information bit is to be embedded in a coefficient
sepuence x. The embedding procedure used is deep embedding

xi+
+ wix i
Xi -

CYO I ,

to embed bit value 1
ail , to embed bit value 0

E5.G)

where w is a random bipolar sepuence Ewi is either -i or +i) and a i is the
threshold ratio.
The watermark domain could be the subband domain or other transform
domains. It is advised that the watermark domain should facilitate distortion
control. If the subband domain is used, the same psychoacoustic model used in MPG
compression can be applied in the artifact control.
The output of the psychoacoustic model analysis is the energy threshold ratio
rib in one scale factor band. The amplitude threshold ratio should satisfy
a, <1 \ ffi E5.4)
It is realized that the psychoacoustic model used in the compression is not quite
accurate in data hiding. The energy distortion control does not imply that artifact
is inaudible as long as the energy in the critical band is unchanged. Although people
tend to "mix" the frepuency components in one critical tend, distortion may still
be perceived. That means the amplitude modification must be sufficiently small. In
practice, the selection of the value ai should be smaller than IF,. In the sensitive
low frepuency range, ai should be further tuned.
Given the random seed, the decoder generates the random sepuence w. The
correlation detector output is
i-

V

=

iwi

i=o

=

N-

xiwi
i=o

i-

E5.5)

xin,
i o

i=o

where ri is the received coefficient and ni is the channel noise. If V > 0, the
decision is bit value i; Otherwise bit value 0 is decided instead.
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It should be noted that the watermark domain selection is not limited to the
subtend decomposition used in MPG. The same principle could be applied in DFT
domain or other transform domains, for instance, the transforms used in MPEG-2
AAC or Dolby AC-G.

(a) Original Signal

(b) Signal After Embedding

—1

—2
(c) Watermark Signal
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Figure 5.8 Amplitude modulation data hiding

5.3.2 Experimental Results
Mono music clips sampled at 44.ikHz are used in the experiments. The information
bit is embedded into the MDCT coefficients from scale factor tends 6 to 18 which
correspond to frequency range from kHz to 10kHz. To decrease the artifacts, the
threshold ail is selected smaller than jib in the same scale factor band. In the
sensitive bands from kHz to GkHz, ail is further tuned to reduce artifacts.
Given a received coefficient r, the normalized detection output is obtained as
V =

< r, w >
r

E5.6)

One information bit is embedded every granule a576 samples) of a mono audio
clip. Figure 5.9 depicts the different V distribution after embedding bit value 1 and
0. The message extraction may not be sufficiently reliable due to the host noise
interference. Some ECC code can be used to enhance its reliability.
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The main advantage of this scheme is that the psychoacoustic model can be
explicitly employed to control the artifact.
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Figure 5.9 Normalized detector output distribution, in amplitude modulation

5.4 Phase Modulation Data Hiding
In music signal perception, it is well known that human ears are more sensitive to the
amplitude than to the phase. The most significant components are signal frepuencies
and amplitudes. The signal amplitude spectrum contains more significant information than the phase spectrum. Data can be hidden in phases with less artifacts
28
5.4.1 Hiding and Extraction
Bender et al. N7] proposed a scheme to hide information into the DFT phase. First,
the audio signal is divided into frames and Discrete Fourier Transform EDFT) is
applied to each frame. Second the DFT phases in the first frame are modified while
,

the phases in the following frames are modified, respectively. Ievertheless, the phase
difference (relative phase) is kept unchanged. This procedure is repeated on the audio
stream.
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Although the phase is believed to be less significant perceptually, people are
still sensitive to the phase continuity between frames. In the above scheme, the frame
continuity is destroyed when the next bit is to be embedded. This may result in a beat
pattern. The abrupt phase change modifies the signal spectrum. Informal listening
tests show that small modifications in DFT phase are inaudible. This property is
exploited for data embedding.
To directly employ SS modulation in the phase domain is not successful as the
original host noise is puite large. The nonlinear schemes discussed in Chapter 4 are
more effective. For instance, the Quantization Index Modulation EQIM) Ni2 can be
applied in phase domain. Figure 5.10 depicts the phase QIM signaling.

Figure 5.10 AIMin phase modulation

In this scheme, the original DFT phase value Oi at one frepuency bin is replaced
by the nearest x point Eto hide bit 1) or the nearest o points (to hide bit 0) on the
unit circle. To embed one bit in a phase sepuence, deterministic patterns are defined
to represent bit values. For example, for a 4-coefficient sequence embedding, two
patterns similar to antipodal signaling can be defined:
Pattern
A: x o x o], represent bit value 1
Pattern -A: o x o x_, represent bit value 0

E5.7)

To hide a bit, 0i is modified to comply with pattern A or -A.
Obviously, the DFT phase noise is much larger if the corresponding amplitude
is smaller. A simple suboptimal detector is a weighted minimum distance detector.
Denote the received DFT amplitude and phase as r and 0,, respectively. Find the
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nearest x and o points ail and

Nib

to

i

and construct two sepuences according to these

two patterns:
2_ 3 /

=
If E r i Ect i — o i ) 2 < E Fri —

K2, file

E5.8)

all 32 , "21
b,

decision is bit value i; Otherwise bit value 0

is decided.
The distortion introduced is determined by the phase difference d between x
and o points. Smaller value of d is selected at the sensitive frepuency bands while
larger value of d may be used at high frequency bands. After embedding, the DFT
phases are fixed at x or o points. To introduce randomness, the value of O il + ail is
replaced by the x or o points where ail is a random shift value.
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Figure 5.11 Normalized output distribution in phase modulation
5.4.2 Experimental Results
In the experiments, DFT length is 512 and the DFT phases from kHz to 8kHz
are changed. The value of di varies from 70/12 to 70/4. To measure the embedding
performance, the normalized correlation output is defined as
2>
< r, u —

E5.9)
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where w is the received phase sepuence and u and v are given by E5.8).
The above can be regarded as the normalized distance detector. The statistical
distribution of V is shown in Figure 5.11. Experimental results indicate that this
scheme is effective in oblivious applications. The audio puality is preserved at
relatively lower SNR than that in amplitude modulation. The main disadvantage is
that accurate distortion is difficult.

5.5 Noise Substitution Data Hiding

Message can also be hidden in the noisy component in audio signals [28, 3Gj
5.5.1 Perception of Noise Components

The audio signal I ad long been regarded as combination of pine waves in the computer
,

music studies. X. Sierra 84 was among the first to introduce noise component in
computer music. Lack of noise component makes the music "unnatural" (A good
example of noise is the breathiness of a flute). Noise component is also perceptually
significant.
In the advanced audio analysis model, noise component is indispensable. In
the HILN model 1], signal is modeled as harmonic-Findividual sines+noise.
Another nfluential model is sines+transients+n ise [56 . Some studies argue
that for noise components, what is significant is not the fine frepuency structure in
noisy bands, but the noise energy shape. The noise energy shape can be described
by its DCT coefficients [i] or by a source filter model. A commonly used model is
the Linear Predictor ELP) filter.
Goodwin et al. 35 proposed the Epuivalent Rectangular Band aERB) noise
modeling. The authors claimed that the energy in ERB is more important than the
noise spectral shape. People do not resolve the fine frequency structure in a noisy
tend, only a "mixing effect" is felt.
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Recently, Levine et al. N56 and Aerma At al. N94 proposed a similar approach
Bark Band Noise Modeling. In noisy bark bands, only the noise energy gain is coded
and transmitted. The reconstructed noise spectrum is flat over the frepuency range
of each bark band. The authors claimed higher puality compared with DCT spectral
envelope and LPC-smoothed representations.
This idea can also be used in audio compression. Fine spectral structure in
noisy bands need not to be encoded. The noise energy gain is adequate. In MPG,
all the vIDCT coefficients are encoded, including the higher frequency ones. This
property can be employed to embed messages in these noisy bands. This is noise
substitution.
5.5.2 Experimental Results

The noisy components can be modified in message embedding, while the energy
gain in noisy bands is kept constant. There are many approaches meeting this
repuirement. One simplest method changes the sign of those coefficients x i 's in noisy
bands by a random pattern. The hiding procedure is
pi xi
—p i x i

to hide bit value 1
to hide bit value 0

E5.10

)

where p is a bipolar random sequence and p i is either —i or +i.
The information bit is extracted via correlation. Given a received sequence r,
the decoder output statistic is
i - 1

V

riPi•

E5 , 1 )

i=o

If V > 0, the extracted bit value is i; Otherwise bit value 0 is decided.

To accurately distinguish the noisy bands from non-noisy ones is not an easy
job. Not all high frepuency coefficients are noisy, some may be the high frequency
components of a transient signal. It is reported that over 80% of the high frepuency
coefficients are non-edged". Several complicated algorithms are proposed in [81] to
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make a distinction between noisy and non-noisy bands. In experiments, for simplicity,
the frepuency bands over 5kHz are regarded as noisy. Informal listening test shows
it is a reasonable assumption.
This method could be applied in different watermark domains. It is advantageous to match the compression decomposition. Because in compression
quantization procedure, a small value coefficient might be puantized to zero, nevertheless it
never inverts its sign. This sign conservative property promises its robustness against
the very compression.
The noise substitution is not robust against low-pass filtering, and it may
not survive the next-generation compression where noise substitution technipue is
used. Nevertheless it survives current perceptual compression schemes, such as
MPG. Experiments show those methods can reach around 20 — 60 bits/second
hiding capacity.

5.6 MP3 Compression and Encryption
Besides watermarking, encryption is also widely studied and deployed in multimedia
protection. It is often used in multimedia email, teleconference to prevent unauthorized
access to the multimedia contents. Multimedia signal scrambling is different from
the general data encryption that involves extensive computation N22, 63]. Two
important considerations are AfficiAncy and security. The former repuires real-time
operation of the decryption process. This is different from the data unscrambling
where off-line operation is acceptable. The security repuirement is not as rigorous as
that in data encryption. Feasible solutions are trade-offs considering these factors.
Current media encryption algorithms fall into two categories. One integrates
scrambling with source coding, viz., to scramble media content before quantization
and coding. The other scrambles compressed bitstream. Usually, it is desired that
the encrypted output is bitstream syntax compatible. Some algorithms have been
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proposed and applied in video and image scenarios N68, 83]. In this section the
encryption schemes 32 in audio signals are discussed.
5.6.1 Encryption Integrated with Source Coding
In this approach, the encryption is performed before puantization and encoding. A
widely used signal scrambling method is time-frepuency permutation 17].

(z )
G ( z)
Paz)
Do.

G2 ( )

H(
Encryption (at Encoder Side)

G(z)
Decryption (at Decoder Side)

Figure 5.12 Time-frepuency permutation
Figure 5.12 shows the block diagram. PEz) is a permutation function and its
inverse function is P EEz)-1 . Its effectiveness has been proved in practice and can be
applied directly in the MPG MDCT domain. The side effect is that the random
permutation changes the coefficient distribution property and renders the Huffman
table non-optimal. The scrambling also destroys the correlation between contiguous
granules. These result in lower compression rate.
There does not exist an easy solution. A possible remedy to enhance Huffman
coding efficiency is to divide the frequency range into several tends, only permute
coefficients within a band. It keeps the coefficient distribution property to some
degree at the price of compromised security.
In addition, for a stereo signal, the coefficients in one granule can be further
permuted between two channels. For most music materials, it is reported that the
left and right channels in a stereo source have little correlation N411]. Thus, swapping
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the data in these channels completely destroys the content. This increases encoding
Edecoding) latency and memory repuirement.
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(B) Granule Order After Shuffle

Figure 5.13 Stereo signal granule shuffle

5.6.2 MP3 Bitstream Syntax

In MPG compression, the sign and amplitude of MP3 MDCT coefficients are coded
separately. The total coefficients are divided into 3 regions: big-value region, smallvalue region and zero region. The big value region at low frepuency end is further
divided into 3 sub-regions where different Huffman tables are used. The small-value
region is composed of coefficient values of +i, —i or 0. Each codeword represents a
pairs of contiguous coefficients in the big-value region or 4 coefficients Equadruple) in
the small-value region. The remaining coefficients are implicitly set to zeros (Figure
5.14).

Frquency
1
1
I I I I ••• I
\_____\,..____-- ss___. sv________,, •-„.„...., .____\,__, \_____\,_. bin
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\
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big-value region

Figure 5.14 Partitioning of MDCT coefficients
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An MP3 frame is an independent decoding unit. Its header() specifies
important parameters for decoding operation, bit rate, sampling frepuency, coding
mode, etc. The encryption should not change these fields.

audio_data()
main_data_begin

for (gr=O; gr<2; gr++)
for (ch=0; ch<nch; ch++)
part2_3_length[gr] [chi]
big_values[gr] [chi]
global_gain[gr][ch]
scalefac_compress[gr][ch]
window_switching_flag[gr][ch]
if(window_switching_flag[gr][ch])
block_type[gr][ch]
mixed_block_flag[gr][ch]
for (region=0; region<2; region++) {
table_select[gr] [ch] [region]
for (window=0; window<3; window++)
subblock_gain[gr] [chi] [region]
} else {
for (region=0; region<3; region++)
table_select[gr] [ch] [region]
regionO_count[gr][ch]
regionl_count[gr][ch]
1
preflag[gr][ch]
scalefac_scale[gr][ch]
count 1 table select[gr] [ch]

1

ma n data()

Figure 5.15 Side information in MPH syntax
The audio_dataO field provides the decoding control parameters and MDT
data Emain-dataE)). The first half of audio_data() specifies the side information
and main_dataO() is composed of the codewords and signs of the MDCT coefficients
EFigure 5.15).
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Although the length of a frame is constant at a given bit rate, bit consumption
for samples in one granule E576 samples) is variable. The "bit reservoir" technipue
permits the current frame to "borrow" bits saved from past frames to absorb the
imbalance. The current frame data may locate in previous frames. The location
where the main_dataE) begins is determined by main_data_begin, a 9-bit offset value.
5.6.3 Encryption in Compressed Domain

In this section, discussion is focused on encryption directly on an MPG bitstream. To
avoid confusing the decoder, the encrypted bitstream should comply with the MPG
bitstream syntax. According to different sensitivity repuirements, three different
protection levels are provided: i) slight protection, where the encrypted bitstream
presents a satisfactory music puality for a casual listener, although not good enough
for Hi-Fi reproduction. This can be used to generate different music versions for
casual users and professionals; 2) moderatA protAction, where the scrambled content
is meaningful and the main music features are kept with obvious degradation. This
can be used for customer evaluation. After test listening, customers could pay and
obtain a decryption key to recover the puality. G) maximum protAction, where the
music content is completely destroyed, rendering the MP3 bitstream meaningless.
To be MPG syntax compatible, the bitstream can not be simply scrambled, since this
generates an invalid bitstream and confuses decoder. And the file size should be kept
unchanged.
The selected Huffman table should not be changed. The minimum unit that
can be manipulated is a codeword Eof a pair of coefficients in the big-value region or
quadruple of 4 coefficients in the small-value region). The encryption can work at the
following levels: codeword level, sub-region level and granule level. The scrambling
is one or combination of these strategies.
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At the codeword level, because the coefficient amplitudes and signs are
separately encoded, the codes can be permuted and Eor) the signs be flipped by
a random pattern. While sign flipping can happen on any non-zero coefficient, the
permutation should be limited to codes using the same Huffman table for syntax
compatibility. For the coefficients whose amplitudes are greater than 15, the linbitM
field can be scrambled without any constraints. At the sub-region level, the subregions can be permuted. Respective permutation is also repuired for related side
information parameters, such as code counts and Huffman table index. At the
granule level, the granules inside a frame can be reordered randomly. The corresponding parameters, such as part2_3_length, etc. should be shuffled for the integrity
of the granule. For different applications, special attention should be taken to meet
the degradation repuirements.
Encryption with Slight Distortion
In the MPG time-frequency decomposition, a fine frepuency resolution is applied
at low and high frepuency bands. At high frepuency end, it is not quite necessary.
That gives us some room for manipulation. The noise perception property should
be used in scrambling. For example, the signs of the MDCT coefficients over 5kHz
can be flipped. The frepuency shape in a critical band is unchanged. In addition,
these coefficients within one scale factor band can be permuted as the noise energy
gain is still kept. The modification is almost transparent for a casual listener. If
more distortion is permitted, the lower frepuency coefficients can even be permuted
or sign-flipping. This operation can be further tuned for specific repuirements.
Encryption with Moderate Degradation
It is believed the frequency amplitude is more important than phase in audio
signal. However, sign-flipping of the non-noisy coefficients introduces obvious degradation. The permutation and sign-flipping can be used in this case. To scramble
medium frepuency coefficients introduces obvious degradation. The audio signal

86
spectrum has a wide dynamic range. To keep features of music clips, the large value
coefficients should be skipped, and only the relatively smaller ones are manipulated.
Experiments reveal that the components under GkHz are perceptually significant and
should not be manipulated much.
Encryption with Maximum Protection
To provide maximum protection, it is desired to completely destroy the audio
content while keeping the bitstream syntax. Sign-flipping and codeword permutation
can be employed at codeword level. The order can be shuffled at the sub-region
level. The side information parameters, such as Huffman table index table_MelAct,
codeword count region_count EFigure 5.15) etc. should also be permuted accordingly.
The permutation can also happen at higher level. For instance, in a stereo signal,
two granules in each channel can be shuffled in one ha me. To abide by the syntax,
the order of the side information parameters should be changed respectively.

5.7 Music Perception and Audio Model Analysis
In this section, the music perception and audio parametric coding is revisited.
Discussion is focused on audio spectral model analysis and how music phenomenon
is explained and described by the model.

5.7.1 Audio Signal Models
In parametric coding, sound signal is analyzed and a parametric representation is
constructed. Different models can be used to describe a sound signal. There are three
kinds of models to describe the sound signal. One is abstract model. For example,
FM modulation 97 approach represents sound signal as
yEt) = AMinEcEt) + [I MiWEMEt))1, E5.12)
where A is the peak amplitude, c(t) is varying carrier frepuency, I is modulation
index and illEt) is the modulated signal. A general audio waveform is approximated
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by an FM modulated signal, although this model does not have apparent physical
interpretation.
PhyMical model is tesed on source modeling. The parametric representation

describes the mechanical and acoustic behavior of a music instrument. The
parameters are different for different instruments. Some instrument physical models
have been studied extensively 88
A very powerful tool in audio analysis is based on spectrum model. Human
psychoacoustic studies reveal the signal short time spectrum is extremely important
for human perception procedure. The perceptual difference is negligible as long as the
short time spectrum of the reconstructed signal is sufficiently close to the spectrum
of the original signal.
Some models have been developed in signal spectrum "description" . The model
individual sineM+harmonic sines+noise is used in N'IPEG-4 parametric coding I In
this model, spectrum is described by some individual sines, harmonic sines and noise

component. Some algorithms just describe signals by harmonic components and
noisy component N43
Much of the computer music generation is based on the spectrum model. Music
has long been regarded as combination of sines. Sierra 84] is among the first to
introduce noisA component in it. All the above audio analysis algorithms model music
signal as a combination of deterministic part and stochastic parts. The following part
describes the influential model proposed i 56, 95
5.7.2 Spectral Model: Transient+Sines+Noise
The most significant part perceptually is the sines in a piece of music. Earlier music
models decompose music into sinusoids and stochastic component noise. Model
analysis extracts the time-varying parameters of amplitude, phase, and frepuency to
describe sinusoids.
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Audio analysis is usually done frame by frame. In each frame, most perceptually
significant uusually those with larger amplitude) sines are picked up and parameters
are estimated to describe them. These parameters include amplitude, frequency
and initial phase. Therefore, suppose in the lth frame, R 1 sinusoids are picked and
extracted. The signal is thus represented as a combination of these sines.

sum)

r=1

EA

d

icon [TnH o + E5.13)

The rth sinusoid is described by a triple
It is natural to find these parameters are different from frame to frame. Further
studies reveal that although those sines are changing, most sines in the current frame
are close to one of those sines in the next frame. So it is reasonable to assume the
sines in the next frame are the continuation of the sines in the previous frame. The
sinusoids are not interpreted as individual sines, but as a sinusoid evolving slowly
from frame to frame. The evolution of the evolving sine is called a tAack.
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Further analysis demonstrates it is reasonable to assume the frequency and
amplitude of those sinusoids are evolving linearly. What people feel is the changing
sinusoids. In a track, the initial phase is not significant and not encoded. At decoder
side, an arbitrary phase is used. Humans may perceive the phase discontinuity at
frame borders. Figure 5.16 shows the evolution of a typical sinusoids. It is seen
that the track gives birth in Frame i, and "dies" in Frame 7. Sinusoidal modeling is
not sufficient to represent audio signals as this model can not track non-stationary
Erapid-changing) signals. The rapid-changing signals are referred as "attacks" in the
previous discussion.
In a clip of music generated by an instrument, the phenomenon usually
match the pattern Attack-Decay-Sustain-Release [45 . Figure 5.17 shows the music
waveform envelope when a key is stricken.
Amplitude

Attack Decay

Sustain

Release

Figure 5.17 Attack-Decay-Sustain-Release pattern

The attack phase which is a rapid-changing part shows non-stationary property
of the signal. It is the most difficult part for coding. In MP3, lots of complexity is
in volved dealing with attacks. In audio model analysis, analysis and experimental

studies proved it is not appropriate to model the attack as the sum of sinusoids.
Basically, transients are broadband signals that can not be well represented by
sinusoids.
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After subtracting the sum of sinusoids from the original signal, the error residue
is analyzed to determine whether transients are present. If so, the attack is described
by transform coefficients N56] or by other methods 94 . Subsequently, the remaining
.

parts are stochastic which can be modeled using an appropriate noise models NG4,
35, 56, 941. In Section 5.5, noise perception is covered. The audio parameters are
perceptually significant, to be robust against the parametric compression, data hiding
should modify these parameters in a transparent way. It is a very challenging task.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

In this research work, some watermarking topics have been covered. The detection
in data hiding is studied and new algorithms are proposed. Much of the focus is
on audio data hiding and human psychoacoustic model. The effectiveness of the
algorithms proposed has been demonstrated in the analytical work and applications.
It is important to achieve watermark compression resilience while meeting
transparency repuirement. Compression reduces the redundancy in the signal
without losing perceptual value Etransparency). Its function is to remove the perceptually insignificant components, while the steganography embeds some perceptually
insignificant information. Note that it does not mean information can not be
embedded in the perceptual significant components. Nevertheless, watermark should
be insignificant to meet the transparency repuirements. Obviously compression and
;

steganography are in a kind of "arms race" N52]. Petitcolas et al. [G] pointed out,
steganography is almost impossible to survive ideal compression.
The above conclusion is easy to understand. In a signal space, perceptually
epual signal points should be compressed to one point by an ideal compression.

If two different points in the space are of same perceptual value, that implies the
compression is not efficient enough Ethus not ideal). Ideal compression does not
exist in reality. It can be concluded that a more efficient compression scheme makes
data hiding more difficult. Some researchers suggest to integrate watermarking
with compression design. This makes the watermarking robust to this compression,
although not guarantee of its survival against other compression algorithms. Wang At
al. presented a watermarking scheme in their proposal to JPEG 2000 _96 . Recently,

Cognicity Corp. has already integrated their hiding technology AudioKey with
Lucent Perceptual Audio Coder EPAC).
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It is desired to take advantage of the compression in data hiding 7 . Some
factors addressed in compression such as puantization and coding, need not to be
considered in steganography. However today's compression robust scheme may not
,

survive the more advanced compression of the next generation.
In order to verify multimedia copyright ownership, watermarking must be
compression and tamper resistant. In the SS modulation scheme, the decoder has
a very rigorous repuirement on synchronization. The watermark verification fails
if the synchronization can not be kept. In image and video applications, watermarking should be robust against geometric distortions, rotation, and translation.
In audio applications, it should survive the more advanced parametric compression
and model-tesed compression. An even more challenging task is to be robust against

timescaie modification and pitch-scale modification.
Many watermarking problems are still unresolved. The ongoing research work
will focus on audio data hiding, especially on study of the hiding schemes resistant
to MPEG-4 compression. Future research topic is the design of compression with
content protection features. A more accurate psychoacoustic model should be
developed for steganography applications based on music signal perception and
understanding.

REFERENCES
1. ISO/IEC FDIS 14496-G Sec 2. "Information technology-Coding of audio-visual
objects, Part 3:Audio, Section 2: Parametric audio coding". 1999.
2. Masoud Aighoniemy and A. H. Tewfik. "Progressive puantized projection
watermarking scheme".
Proc. 7th ACM International Multimedia
ConferAncA, pages 295-298, Iov. 1999.
3. Ross J. Anderson and Fabien A. P. Petitcolas.
"On the limits of
steganography". IEEE Trans. Journal of Selected Areas in Communications, 16E4):474-481, May 1998.
4. Michael Arnold and Setestian Kanka. "MP3 robust audio watermarking" .
Proc. DFG V1ID1I Watermarking Workshop's, Erlangen, Germany,
1999.
5. M Barni, F. Bartolini, and F. Rigacci. "Statistical modelling of full frame
dct coefficients". Proc. EUSIPCO 98, 9th European Signal Processing
ConfArencA, 6(8-11):1512-1516 Sept. 1998.
6. P. Bassia and I. Pitas. "Robust audio watermarking in the time domain". Proc.
EUSIPCO'98, 9th European Signal ProcAssing Conference, pages 25-28,
Sept. 1998.
7. C. Bender, D. Gruhi, I. Morimoto, and A. Lu. "Technipue for data hiding"
IBM System Journal, 35aG-4):313-336,1996.
8. J A. Bloom, I. J. Cox, T. Kalker J-P. Linnartz, M. L. Miller, and B. Traw.
"Copy protection for DAD video" . Proc. IEEE Special IssuA on IdAntification and Protection of Multimedia Information, 87E7):1267-1276,1999.
9. L. Boney, A. H. Tewfik, and K. N. Hamdy. "Digital watermarks for
audio signals" . Proc. IEEE International ConfArence on Multimedia
Computing and Systems, pages 473-480, June 1996.
10. Karlheinz Brandenburg and Gerhard Stoll. "ISO-MPEG-1 Audio: A generic
standard for coding of high-quantity digital audio". Journal Audio
Engeering Society, 42(10):780-792, Oct. 1994.
11. B. Chen and G. C. Cornell. "Digital watermarking and information
embedding using dither modulation". Proc. of IEEE 2nd Workshop on
MultimAdia Signal Processing'98, pages 273-278 Dec. 1998.
12. B. Chen and G. C. Cornell. "Dither modulation: A new approach to digital
watermarking and information embedding". Proc. of SPICE: SAcurity and
WatArmarking of Multimedia Contents, 3657:344-353, Jan. 1999.

93

94
13. Digimarc Corp., Macrovision Corp., and Philips Research. "The Millennium
Group: DAD copy-protection system, A Technical overview". Aug. 1999.
14. I. Cox and M. L. Miller. "A review of watermarking and the importance of
perceptual modeling". Proceeding of Electronic Imaging, Feb. 1997.
15. I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, T. Leighton, and T. Shainoon. "Secure spread spectrum
watermarking for images, audio, and video". NEC Research Technical
Report, 10,1995.
16. I. J. Cox, Joe Kilian, Tom Leighton, and Talal Shamoon. "A Secure, robust
watermark for multimedia". Workshop on Information Hiding'96, May
1996
17. Charles D. Creusere and Sanjit K. Mitra. "Efficient image scrambling using
polyphase filter tenks". Proc. IGIP'94, 2:81-85, 1994.
18. B. L. Yeo D. Benham, N. Memon and M. Yeung. "Fast watermarking of DCTbased compressed images". Proc. International Conference on Image
SciAnce, Systems, and Technology (CISST'97), Las Vagas, pages 243—
253, June 1997.
19 grant A. Davidson, Louis D. Fielder, and Brian D. Link and.
"Parametric hit allocation in a perceptual audio coder".
http://www.dolby.com/tech/highqual.html.
20. J. F. Delaigel, D. De Aleeschouwer, and B. Macp. "Low cost perceptive digital
picture watermarking method". Proc. ECMAST'97, Milan, Italy, pages
153-167, May 1997.
21. Geert Depovere, Ton Kalker, and Jean-Paul Linnartz. "Improved watermark
detection reliability using filtering before correlation". Proc. IGIP'94,
i:430-434, 1998.
22. C. Diffie and M. E. Hellman. "New directions in cryptography". IEEE Trans.
on Information ThAory, 22:644-654, Nov. 1976.
23. E. Eberlein, H. Popp, B. Grill, and J. Herre. "Layer III a flexible coding
standard". Audio EnginAering Society preprint 3498, 9th ConvAntion,
Berlin, GArmany, March 1993.
24. M. Kutter F. Jordan and T. Ebrahimi. "Proposal of a watermarking technipue
for hiding/retrieving data in compressed and decompressed video".
ISO/IEC Doc. JTC1/SC29/1/VG11/MPEG97/M2281, June 1997.
25. J. Fridrich. "Image watermarking for tamper detection". Proc. ICIP'98, 2:404—
408, Oct. 1998.

95
26. G. Friedman. "The trustworthy digital camera: Restoring credibility to the
photographicimage . IEEE Trans. Consumer ElActronics, 39:905-910,
Nov. 1993.
27. Litao Gang, Ali N. Akansu, and Mahalingam Ramkumar. "Periodic signaling
scheme in oblivious data hiding". Proc. 34th Asilomar Conference on
Signals, Systems, and ComputArs 2000, pages 1851-1855, Iovember
2000.
28. Litao Gang, Ali N. Akansu, and Mahalingam Ramkumar. "MPG resistant
oblivious steganography". Proc. ICASSP'2001, pages 0000-0000, May
2001
29. Litao Gang, Ali N. Akansu, and Mahalingam Ramkumar. "Ionlinear
modulation in oblivious steganography". Accepted in Proc. IEEEER UASIPNon-linear Signal and Image Processing'2001 pages 0000-0000, June 2001.
30. Litao Gang, Ali N. Akansu, and Mahalingam Ramkumar. "Performance
analysis of spread spectrum modulation in data hiding".
Proc.
SPIE'2001, California, pages 0000-0000, July 2001.
31. Litao Gang, Ali N. Akansu, and Mahalingam Ramkumar. "Set partitioning
in oblivious data hiding". Pro. ICASSP'2001, pages 0000-0000 May
2001
32. Litao Gang, Ali N. Akansu, Mahalingam Ramkumar, and Xuelei Xie. "On-line
music protection and MP3 compression". Proc. International Symposium
on Intelligent Signal Informaton Multimedia Processing'2001, Hongkong,
pages 13-16, May 2001.
33. Litao Gang, Ali I. Akansu, and Taha H. Sencar. "Transform selection in
steganography". Proc. Annual Conference on Information Sciences and
Systems, Maryland, March 2001.
34. M. Goodwin. "Residual modeling in music analysis-synthesis". Proc.
ICASSP'96, 1996.
35. M. Goodwin. "Adaptive signal models: Theory, algorithms, and audio applications". Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkley, 1997.
36. F. Hartung and B. Girod. "Digital watermarking of raw and compressed
video". Proc. EuropAan EOS/SPIE Symposium on Advanced Imaging
and Network Technologies, Berlin, Germany, Oct. 1996.
37. F. Hartung and B. Girod. "Fast public-key watermarking of compressed video".
Proc. IEEE ICIP'97, Santa Barbara, CA, Oct. 1997.

96

38. F. Hartung and B. Girod. "Digital watermarking of uncompressed and
compressed video".
Special Issue
Trans. of Signal Processing
on Copyright Protection and Access Control for Multimedia SArvicAs,
66EG):283-301, 1998.
39. F. Hartung and B. Girod. "Watermarking of uncompressed and compressed
video". Signal Processing, 66EG):283-301, May 1998.
40. C. C. Heistrom.
"Protebility and Stochastic Processes for Engineers".
Macmillan, New YorA, 1991.
41. Jurgen Herre, Ernst Eberlein, and Karlheinz Brandenburg. "Combined stereo
coding". AES preprint 3369, 93rd Convention, Calif USA, Oct. 1992.
42. Mikio Ikeda, Kazuya Takeda, and Fumitada Itakura. "Audio data hiding by
use of band-limited random sequences". Proc. ICASSP'99, 4:231S-2318,
1999.
"Statistics and, Music: Fitting a Local Harmonic
43. Rafael Angel Irizarry.
Model to Music Sound. Signals". PhD. Thesis, University of California,
Berkeley, 1998.
44. ISO/IEC. "IS 11172-G: Coding of moving pictures and associated audio for
digital storage media at up to about 1.SMbits/s". ISO/IEC, 1993.
45. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. Jim Heckroth. "Tutorial on MIDI and music
synthesis". http://hom,e.earthlinA.net/ mma/Tutorial/Tutor.htm.
46. Neil F. Johnson and Sushil Jajedia. "Steganalysis of images created using
current steganography software".
47. J. D. Johnston. "Transform coding of audio signals using perceptual noise
criteria". IEEE Trans. Journal of SelActed Areas in Communications,
6:314-323, Feb. 1988.
48. Steven M. Kay. "Fundamentals of Statistical Signal Processing" VolumA 2,
Prentice-Hall PTR, 1993.
49. D. Kundur and D. Hatzinakos. "Digital watermarking using multiresolution
wavelet decomposition". Proc. ICASP'98, S:2969-2972, May 1998.
50. M. Kutter, F. Jordan, and F. Bossen. "Digital signature of color images using
amplitude modulation". Proc. Electronic Image'97, San JosA, CA, May
1997
51. M. Kutter, F. Jordan, and F. Bossen. "Digital signature of color images using
amplitude modulation". Journal of ElActronic Imaging, 7E2):326-332,
April 1998.

97

52. Jack Lacy, Schuyler R. Auackenbush, Amy R. Reibman, and James H. Snyder.
"Intellectual property protection systems and digital watermarking".
Optics ExprAss, 3Ei2), Dec. 1998.
53. C. Langelaar, J. C. A. yen der Lubbe, and R. L. Lagendijk. "Robust labeling
methods for copy protection of images". Proc. ElActronic Irnaging'97,
San Jose, CA. 3022 298-309, Feb. 1997.
.

54. G C. Langelaar, J. C. A. van der Lubbe, and J. Biemond. "Copy protection
for multimedia data tesed on labeling technipues". Proc. 7th Symposium
IWformation Theory in Benelux, Enschede, The Netherlands, May 1996.
55. Sang-Kwang Lee and Yo-Sung Ho. "Digital audio watermarking in the
cepstrum domain" . IEEE Trans. Consumer ElActronics, 46EG):334-335,
Aug. 2000.
56. S. Levine. "Audio representations for data compression and compressed domain
processing" . Ph.D. thesis, StanfoAd University, 1998.
57. Eug e T. Lin and Edward J. Delp. "A review of fragile image watermark".
Proc. ACM Multimedia, IVPaltimcdia and Content Security Workshop,
pages 2S-29, Oct. 1999.
. Marisour and A. Tewfik. "Audio watermarking by time-scale modification".
Proc. ICASSP'2000, May 2001.
59. M. L. Miller, I. J. Cox, and J. A. Bloom. "Catermarking in the real world:
An application to DAD". Proc. 33rd Asilomar Conference on Signals,
SystAms, and ComputArs, pages 1496-1S02, 1999.
60.

Nourishing Morimoto. "Digital watermarking technology with practical applications". Informing Science (Special Issue on MultimAdia Informing
Technologies), 2(4):107-111, 1999.

61. Pierre Moulin and Joseph A. O'Sullivan. "Information-theoretic analysis of
watermarking". Proc. ICASSP'2000, Istanbul, S:3630-3633, Jun. 2000.
62. N. Nikolaidis and I. Pitas. "Copyright protection of images using robust digital
signatures". Proc. ICASSP'96, Atlanta, GA, 4:2168-2171, May 1996.
63. National Institute of Standards and Technology ENIST). "FIPS Publication
46-i: Data Encryption Standard" . Jan. 1998.
64. A. A. Oppenheim and J. S. Lim. "The importance of phase in signals". IEEE
processing, 69ES):Si2-S41, May 1981.
6S. Davis Pan.
"A tutorial on MPEG/audio compression". IEEE Trans.
Multimedia Journal. 199S.

98
66. S. Pankanti and M. Yeung. "Aerification watermarks on fingerprint recognition and retrieval". Proc. ISCT/SPIE ConferAnce on Security and
WatArmarking of Multimedia Contents, pages 67-78, Jan. 1999.
67. A. Piva, M. Barni, E. Bartoloni, and A. Cappellini. "DCT-based watermarking
recovering without resorting to the uncorrupted original image". Proc.
ICIP'97, Santa Barbara, CA, i:520-523,1997.
68. Lintian Qiao and Kiara Nahrstedt. "A new algorithm for MPEG video
encryption".
Proc. International ConferencA on Imaging SciAncA,
SystAms, and Technology (c1ISST'97), Las Vegas, pages 21-29,1997.
69. Lintian Qiao and Kiara Iahrstedt. "Ion-invertible watermarking methods
for MPEG encoded audio". Proc. SPIE ConferAnce on Security and
WatArmarking of Multimedia Contents, 3657:194-202, Jan. 1999.
70. 1. Ramkumar and A. N. Akansu. "A robust scheme for oblivious detection
of watermarks/data hiding in still images". Proc. SPIE, Symposium on
Voice, Video and Data Communication, 3528:474-481, Nov. 1998.
71. M. Ramkumar and A. N. Akansu. "Self-noise suppression schemes for blind
image steganographv". SPIE SpAcial Session on Image SAcurity, 384S,
Sept. 1999.
72. M. Ramkumar and A. N. Akaiisu. "Some design issues for robust data hiding
systems". Proc. 33rd Asilomar ConferAncA on Signals, SystAms, and
Computers, Oct. 1999.
73. M. Ramkumar, A. N. Akansu, and A. A. Alatan. "A robust data hiding scheme
for digital images using DAFT". Proc. ICIP'97, II:211-215, Oct. 1999.
74. M. Ramkumar, A. N. Akansu, and A. A. Alatan. "On the choice of transforms
for data hiding in compressed video". Proc. ICASSP'99, AI:3049-3052,
March 1999.
75.

Aaha1ingam Ramkumar. "Data Hiding in Multimedia - Theory and Applications". Ph.D. Thesis, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Jan. 2000.

76. R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman. "A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems". Communications of the ACM,
21E2):120-126, Feb. 1978.
77. J. J. K. Ruanaidh, C. J. Dowling, and F. M. Boland. "Phase watermarking
of digital images". Proc. ICIP'97, pages 239-242, Sept. 1996.
78. J. J. K. Ruanaidh and T. Pun. "Rotation, scale and translation invariant
spread spectrum digital image watermarking". Signal Processing,
66EG):303-317, May 1998.

99

79. A. Said and C. A. Pearlman. "A new fast and ellicient implementation of
an image codec tesed on set partitioning in hierarchical trees". IEEE
Trans. Circuits and SystAms for Video Technology, 6EG):243-250, June
1996.
80. B. Schneier. "Applied Cryptography". New York: Wiley, 1996.
81. D. Schulz. "Improving audio codecs by noise substitution . Journal Audio
EnginAAriWg Society., 44E7/8):593-598, Jul./Aug. 1996.
82.

. Shapiro. "Embedded image coding using zerotrees of wavelet coefficients". IEEE Trans. Signal ProcAssing, 41Ei2):3445-3462,1993.

83. Changgui Shi and Bharat Bhargava.
"A fast MPEG video encryption
algorithm". Proc. ACM MultimAdia '98, Bristol, UK, pages 81-88,1998.
84. X. Sierra and J. Smith. "Musical sound modeling with sinusoids plus noise".
Webpage http://www.iva.upf.es/ sums/.
85. D. Stinson. "Cryptography Theory and Practice". Boca Raton, FL: CRC
Press, 1995.
86. J. K. Su and B. Girod. "Power-spectrum condition for energy-efficient watermarking". Proc. ICIP'99, Oct. 1999.
87. J. K. Su, F. Hartung, and B. Girod. "A channel model for a watermark
attack".
Proc. SPIE, Security and Watermarking of MultimAdia
Contents, Electronic Imaging '99, San Jose, CA, 3657:159-170, Jan.
1999
88. C. R. Sullivan. "Extending the Karplus-Strong filter to synthesize electric
guitar timbres with distortion and feedback". ComputAr Music Journal,
14:G, 26 37.
89. M. Swanson, B. Zhu, and A. H. Tewfik. "Data hiding for video- -video". Proc.
ICIP'99, Santa Barbara, CA, 2:676-679, Oct. 1997.
90. M. D. Swanson, B. Zhu, and A. H. Tewfik. "Robust data hiding for images".
Proc. IEEE Digital Signal ProcAssing Workshop, pages 37-40, Sept.
1996.
91.I. D. Swanson, B. Zhu, and A. H. Tewfik. "Multiresolution scene-based
video watermarking using perceptual models". IEEE Trans. Journal
on Selected Area in Communications, 16E4):540-550, May 1998.
92. M. D. Swanson, Bin Zhu, and A. H. Tewfik. "Transparent robust image watermarking". Proc. ICIP'96, Sept. 1996.

100

93. R. G. van Schyndel, A. Z. Tirkel, and C. F. Osborne. "A digital watermark".
Proc. ICIP'96, 2:86-90, 1994.
94. T. Aerma. "A perceptually based audio signal model with application to
scalable audio compression". Ph.D. ThAsis, Stanford University, 2000.
95. T. Aerma, S. Levine, and T. Meng. "Transient modeling synthesis: a flexible
transient analysis synthesis tool for transient signals". Proc. of International Computer Music ConferencA, pages 164-167, Sept. 1997.
96. Houng-Jyh Cang, Yi-Liang Bao, C-C. Kuo, and Homer H. Chen. "Multithreshold wavelet codec EEMTCC), Document Ko. WG1N805, Geneva,
Switzerland". http://costard. Esc. du/ cckuo/, March 1998.
97. B. Winduratna. "FM analysis/synthesis based audio coding" AES 104th
Convention, Preprint 6966„ May 1998.
98. R. B. Wolfgang and E. J. Delp. "A watermark for digital images". Proc.
ICIP'98, pages 219-222, Sept. 1996.
99. RayMond B. Wolfgang, Christine I. Podilchuk, and Edward J. Delp.
"Perceptual watermarks for digital images and video". Proceedings of
IEEE, 7:1108-1126, July 1999.
100. M. Wu and B. Liu. "Watermarking for image authentication". Proc. ICIP'96,
Chicago, 1998.
101. X. Xia, C. Boncelet, and G. Arced. "A multiresolution watermark for digital
images". Proc. ICIP'97, Santa Barbara, CA, i:548-551, Oct. 1997.
102. M. Yeung and F. Mintzer. "Invisible watermarking for image verification".
Journal of ElActronic Imaging, 7:578-591, July 1998.
103. C. Zhu, Z. Xiong, and Y. Q. Zhang. "Multiresolution watermarking for images
and video: a unilied approach". Proc. ICIP'96, Chicago, Illinois, i:465—
468,1998.

